**Civil war in: Angola**

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| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Begin to cooperate on integrating selected UNITA officers and troops into the Angolan Armed Forces, and on demobilizing those remaining in the quartering areas.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“At the beginning of December 1996, Boutros-Ghali, in his last report on Angola as secretary-general, was able to report that over 69,000 UNITA troops had presented themselves at the I 5 UN assembly areas and that, despite worryingly high desertion rates, almost 19,000 of the planned 26,300-strong UNITA component of the integrated FAA had been selected. On 10 April I997, on the eve of the inauguration of the unity government, just under 8,000 UNITA troops had been incorporated into the FAA with about another 10,500 selected for future integration; 10 UNITA generals had also been sworn in to the new national force.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“The Panel did however receive direct testimony from General Bandua that in 1995 the Government of Congo (Brazzaville) had acceded to a request by Savimbi to facilitate the purchase of 10,000 military uniforms in violation of United Nations sanctions. Bandua said that he had been instructed by Savimbi to work through the Government in Brazzaville to purchase 5000 fatigues and 5000 green French style uniforms, which were to be paid for in cash with US dollars. The uniforms were in turn bought from a French factory under the cover of the Brazzaville Government, and came by ship to Pointe Noire, and then on an Antonov 74 aircraft from Pointe Noire to Bailundo. Bandua stated that there was no direct contact with the French Government on the deal and that Savimbi had in fact deceived the Congolese Government by claiming that he did not want his troops who were being demobilized to turn up in torn civilian clothing but wanted them to look "spic and span" since UNITA was a great party and had to maintain its prestige.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In the subsequent demobilization process, much of the equipment handed in by UNITA was no longer serviceable, and many of the soldiers entering the demobilization camps were reportedly too young or too old to be fighters. Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.”

--Paul Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1998), 105.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation. The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process - in the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations…Angolan…civil society actors including non-governmental organizations…should contemplate their involvement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.0612** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Make available all necessary funds it has pledged and speed up the processing of demobilization certificates.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“At the beginning of December 1996, Boutros-Ghali, in his last report on Angola as secretary-general, was able to report that over 69,000 UNITA troops had presented themselves at the I 5 UN assembly areas and that, despite worryingly high desertion rates, almost 19,000 of the planned 26,300-strong UNITA component of the integrated FAA had been selected. On 10 April I997, on the eve of the inauguration of the unity government, just under 8,000 UNITA troops had been incorporated into the FAA with about another 10,500 selected for future integration; 10 UNITA generals had also been sworn in to the new national force.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The demobilization process remained solidly behind schedule during the entre length of its intended implementation. The peace process collapsed in 1998 without either side even being significantly demobilized.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In the subsequent demobilization process, much of the equipment handed in by UNITA was no longer serviceable, and many of the soldiers entering the demobilization camps were reportedly too young or too old to be fighters. Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.”

--Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1998), 105.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The demobilization process remained solidly behind schedule during the entre length of its intended implementation. The peace process collapsed in 1998 without either side even being significantly demobilized.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate w/the Gov't of Angola in the task of creating integrated Angolan Armed Forces and police units which would begin the extension of state administration into areas formerly occupied by UNITA.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“In 1996 the Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM expanded its coverage with a presence in each provincial capital. UNITA allowed its presence into its zones…under the auspices of UNAVEM…The Peace Process was still badly delayed in early 1997.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“The Panel did however receive direct testimony from General Bandua that in 1995 the Government of Congo (Brazzaville) had acceded to a request by Savimbi to facilitate the purchase of 10,000 military uniforms in violation of United Nations sanctions. Bandua said that he had been instructed by Savimbi to work through the Government in Brazzaville to purchase 5000 fatigues and 5000 green French style uniforms, which were to be paid for in cash with US dollars. The uniforms were in turn bought from a French factory under the cover of the Brazzaville Government, and came by ship to Pointe Noire, and then on an Antonov 74 aircraft from Pointe Noire to Bailundo. Bandua stated that there was no direct contact with the French Government on the deal and that Savimbi had in fact deceived the Congolese Government by claiming that he did not want his troops who were being demobilized to turn up in torn civilian clothing but wanted them to look "spic and span" since UNITA was a great party and had to maintain its prestige.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation. The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process - in the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations…Angolan…civil society actors including non-governmental organizations…should contemplate their involvement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118

“In 1996 the Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM expanded its coverage with a presence in each provincial capital. UNITA allowed its presence into its zones…under the auspices of UNAVEM…The Peace Process was still badly delayed in early 1997.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Avoid offensive military operations in the areas formerly occupied by UNITA.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the 'neutral zones' separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“The food crisis in 1997 was aggravated by the surveyed population being inaccessible to relief organisations because of government military operations and an embargo on UNITA held areas. The observed crude mortality before the ceasefire is more than double normal levels. Had humanitarian assistance been available, this excess mortality might have been partially limited.”

--Thomas Grein, Francesco Checci, “Mortality Among Displaced Former UNITA members and their families in Angola: A Retrospective Cluster Survey,” Briitsh Medical Journal, 20 September 2003.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government repeatedly engaged in hostilities and violent exchanges with troops in UNITA controlled areas throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the 'neutral zones' separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government repeatedly engaged in hostilities and violent exchanges with troops in UNITA controlled areas throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet inside Angola and move rapidly to national reconciliation, followed by a government of national unity and reconciliation before 12/31/96.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi, José Eduardo dos Santos**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The year 1997 started on a more upbeat note after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos spoke by telephone in December for the first time in many months, agreeing on January 9 to complete the implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol. The development of a government of national unity, the demobilization of UNITA, and the full restoration of state control over local government was due to be completed on February 28. However, UNITA had not fulfilled its obligations by this time and a new deadline was set for March 16, to be marked by the installation of UNITA’s leadership in Luanda. When UNITA declared on March 6 that it had demilitarized all its forces, the government responded by legalizing UNITA as a political party and appointing three governors and seven vice-governors nominated by UNITA. Both sides also agreed on the list of six ambassadors nominated by UNITA. On March 31, a law granting special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party was promulgated. On April 1, Radio Vorgan, the UNITA radio station, ceased broadcasting. On the same day a UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Despite the continuing hostilities, the one measure that did manage to make headway was the creation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. Jonas Savimbi quarreled in order to have the vice-presidency, which later he demanded to have an equal partnership with the president in the Unity government, and there was eventually a breakdown in talks, but for 1997-1998, there were repeated meetings of the government of National Unity in order to establish the precise nature and workings of such a government.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“I doubt the possibilities for power-sharing in Angola… the kind of partnership which a coalition government would require was not in the cards, given the apparent ideological differences, radically dissimilar personalities, and deep personal animosity which characterized relations between the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi. The gulf of personal mistrust between the two was so vast as to be probably unbridgeable…I hardly ever attended a meeting with either that did not contain some comment of suspicion or disdain - even contempt - for his rival.”

--Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (New York: St Martin's 1996), 519.

“The situation over Savimbi's status remained unresolved at the beginning of I997, with UNITA citing it as a justification for delaying broader political progress.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“The year 1997 started on a more upbeat note after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos spoke by telephone in December for the first time in many months, agreeing on January 9 to complete the implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol. The development of a government of national unity, the demobilization of UNITA, and the full restoration of state control over local government was due to be completed on February 28. However, UNITA had not fulfilled its obligations by this time and a new deadline was set for March 16, to be marked by the installation of UNITA’s leadership in Luanda. When UNITA declared on March 6 that it had demilitarized all its forces, the government responded by legalizing UNITA as a political party and appointing three governors and seven vice-governors nominated by UNITA. Both sides also agreed on the list of six ambassadors nominated by UNITA. On March 31, a law granting special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party was promulgated. On April 1, Radio Vorgan, the UNITA radio station, ceased broadcasting. On the same day a UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Despite the continuing hostilities, the one measure that did manage to make headway was the creation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. Jonas Savimbi quarreled in order to have the vice-presidency, which later he demanded to have an equal partnership with the president in the Unity government, and there was eventually a breakdown in talks, but for 1997-1998, there were repeated meetings of the government of National Unity in order to establish the precise nature and workings of such a government.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Reach agreement on the special status of the President of UNITA as the President of the largest opposition party before 12/31/96.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The situation over Savimbi's status remained unresolved at the beginning of I997, with UNITA citing it as a justification for delaying broader political progress.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“On 27 August UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi formally rejected the offer of vice-presidency of Angola. The offer was made by President dos Santos following a request by Jonas Savimbi himself at a meeting between the two in Libreville on 1 March. In response to the UNITA leader's rejection of the post the Angolan Government called on the Joint Commission - which is made up of the Angolan Government; UNITA; UNAVEM III; and the troika of Russia, the United States and Portugal - to withdraw the "special status" given to Savimbi under the Lusaka Protocol. Although this request has been rejected, the head of UNAVEM III, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative Alioune Blondin Beye stated that "after rejecting the Government's offer, it [UNITA] must now make a proposal.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“The National Assembly approved a special status for the President of UNITA as the Leader of the Largest Opposition Party, but Dr. Savimbi still refuses to…comply with the Peace Agreement…and threatens security in the region…”

--NEW YORK, 28 AUGUST 1997 STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ANTÓNIO MONTEIRO, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL, TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 3814th MEETING (the situation in Angola).

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was an issue of serious contention. Jonas Savimbi equivocated regarding his intended and desired status as either president of the minority party or vice president or another kind of presidency within the government. There were frequent talks on this issue.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 27 August UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi formally rejected the offer of vice-presidency of Angola. The offer was made by President dos Santos following a request by Jonas Savimbi himself at a meeting between the two in Libreville on 1 March. In response to the UNITA leader's rejection of the post the Angolan Government called on the Joint Commission - which is made up of the Angolan Government; UNITA; UNAVEM III; and the troika of Russia, the United States and Portugal - to withdraw the "special status" given to Savimbi under the Lusaka Protocol. Although this request has been rejected, the head of UNAVEM III, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative Alioune Blondin Beye stated that "after rejecting the Government's offer, it [UNITA] must now make a proposal.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was an issue of serious contention. Jonas Savimbi equivocated regarding his intended and desired status as either president of the minority party or vice president or another kind of presidency within the government. Eventually Savimbi rejected his perceived lower status of presidency within the government.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Travel to Luanda for the creation of a Gov't of National Unity and Reconciliation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi has still not returned to Luanda as required, citing a string of excuses relating to security fears or alleged non-compliance by the Government with its requirements under the Lusaka Protocol. The fact that Savimbi refused to sign the declaration of demobilisation on 6 March sending his deputy, Antonio Dembo in-stead, also precipitated speculation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The situation over Savimbi's status remained unresolved at the beginning of I997, with UNITA citing it as a justification for delaying broader political progress.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The year 1997 started on a more upbeat note after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos spoke by telephone in December for the first time in many months, agreeing on January 9 to complete the implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol. The development of a government of national unity, the demobilization of UNITA, and the full restoration of state control over local government was due to be completed on February 28. However, UNITA had not fulfilled its obligations by this time and a new deadline was set for March 16, to be marked by the installation of UNITA’s leadership in Luanda.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“A national unity government was installed in April of 1997, but serious fighting resumed in late 1998, rendering hundreds of thousands of people homeless…”

--Patrick Chabal, Angola: The Weight of History, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 143.

“The Council also expressed its hope for a meeting between the President of Angola and the leader of UNITA. The representative of Angola said the formation of a government of national unity did not mean that the peace process was finished. None the less, Angolans could now turn to the establishment of the rule of law under which individual and collective rights were respected and in which political differences could be resolved in parliament. Although national reconstruction was a challenge requiring continued international support, the future of Angola was now in the hands of Angolans.”

--“Recent Developments”, Angola UNAVEM III, 30 June 1997, UN Department of Public Information

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi continued throughout 1997 to remain outside of functional talks towards making final agreements regarding the unity government. The talks still happened, and UNITA was involved for the most part, but Savimbi proved to have too many sticking points to eventually create the government structure.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“I doubt the possibilities for power-sharing in Angola… the kind of partnership which a coalition government would require was not in the cards, given the apparent ideological differences, radically dissimilar personalities, and deep personal animosity which characterized relations between the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi. The gulf of personal mistrust between the two was so vast as to be probably unbridgeable…I hardly ever attended a meeting with either that did not contain some comment of suspicion or disdain - even contempt - for his rival.”

--Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (New York: St Martin's 1996), 519.

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi continued throughout 1997 to remain outside of functional talks towards making final agreements regarding the unity government. The talks still happened, and UNITA was involved for the most part, but Savimbi proved to have too many sticking points to eventually create the government structure.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Full and more effective implementation of the program for the disarmament of the civilian population, including disarmament of the Civilian Defence Corps.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In some areas returned to government control, the police were accused by UNITA of using excessive force to disarm civilians; consequently the Joint Commission called on the government in January to halt such disarming, despite popular criticism that the process was proceeding too slowly.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Angolan government has asked Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement to "scrupulously" complete all its obligations in the ongoing peace process by January 22, 1998. In a new timetable recently submitted both to the international mediators and to UNITA itself, the government says that the steps UNITA should finalize by January 22 include the surrender to the UN mission (MONUA) of soldiers still armed, and their weaponry, as well as full cooperation in the normalizing of state administration throughout the country, especially in such key locations as Bailundo, Andulo (in central region), Cazombo (east) and Jamba (southeast). A demand has also been issued to UNITA to produce a public declaration stating the time plan for the end of the demobilization process. MONUA officials have repeatedly accused UNITA of unilaterally suspending the implementation of the peace process by putting a stop to the surrender of large tracts of the country's territory to the government. This is allegedly in retaliation for the UN security council sanctions of October 30. Because of this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned of tighter sanctions if UNITA persistently takes no steps to implement the tasks stipulated in the 1994 Lusaka peace plan.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

“UNITA have failed to demobilise their army and hand over their weapons. This has led the United Nations to impose further international sanctions against the rebels(see APM no.2 vol. IV). According to reliable sources, the six thousand UNITA troops which in October had turned up at UN camps for registration and demobilisation, demanded their weapons back and left the camps following the imposition of UN sanctions on UNITA at the end of October. They have now rejoined their comrades-in-arms, making up a military force estimated to be between 15,000 and 35,000 strong.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“The Angolan army has made fresh allegations that UNITA is preparing tore launch military conflict. UNITA have counter-charged that the government thas been preparing for a military assault in the north of the country. The commander of the Angolan army's southern front, General Francisco Furtado, stated on 13 November that UNITA had moved hidden long-range artillery and other weapons to new command posts. He also asserted that it was building up military bases in the regions on Benguela and Huila in the South, Bie and Huambo in the centre and Cuando-Cubango in the south west. This was in part confirmed by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) who warned on 7 November of an increasing number of security incidents in Benguela province. The Angolan government also charged that UNITA have shelled several villages in Huila province, forcing hundreds of villagers to flee their homes. In response to armed actions by UNITA, on 11 November, 22 UNITA soldiers were arrested and charged with attacking a police unit at Kangandala, in northern Angola. A further deserter from UNITA's military wing has further strengthened the Angolan army's allegations.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola made no serious efforts to disarm the civilian population in 1996 or 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation. The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process - in the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations…Angolan…civil society actors including non-governmental organizations…should contemplate their involvement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola made no serious efforts to disarm the civilian population in 1996 or 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of UN and other international personnel and premises and to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of humanitarian supplies.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Relief and rehabilitation food aid needs were re-assessed by WFP during the mission, in close consultation with those agencies and government bodies involved in both the delivery and the coordination of humanitarian aid. Discussions were held with NGOs, donors, government bodies and other UN agencies at both national and provincial levels throughout the country…Despite the good climatic conditions of this year and subsequent production increases, a large proportion of the population still remains food insecure…

The total number of people to be provided with humanitarian food assistance, as assessed by the mission, represents a reduction of approximately 25 percent over the 1997 mission estimates. The most important factors influencing this decrease have been the successful resettlement of around 60-80,000 people during 1997/98, primarily in Bengo, Kwanza Sul and Kwanza Norte, and the in accessible and secure areas of Kuando Kubango, Bie, and Moxico provinces…However, the slow pace of normalization of rural administration, delays in the national reconciliation process, and deteriorating security conditions, continue to limit the activities of humanitarian agencies and discourage the majority of the displaced and refugees from returning to their areas of origin. At the time of the mission - just before the main harvest - people have been fleeing from their villages and abandoning their fields due to the deterioration in the security situation…This poor security situation has not only resulted in a postponement of the plans for the return of the majority of the internally displaced and refugees, but also in new population displacements. Furthermore, a number of people who could not return to their areas of origin were temporarily resettled in intermediate locations: these populations are generally unable to attain a satisfactory degree of food security, principally due to a combination of a lack of available land and poor soil fertility in the areas of transitory resettlement…Rehabilitation programmes, for both the social and basic infrastructures, have also been seriously curtailed by the poor security conditions, especially in those areas where the vast majority of the population is due to resettle.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“UNITA continued its aggressions and took hostages when possible…on 24 March 1998, soldiers from UNITA were witnessed in an armed attack on a UN Team Site. The UN Mission Area and Area Residences were looted and destroyed. UN vehicles were stolen. Armed elements of the UNITA army kidnapped two Portuguese shopkeepers. The couple was abducted from the commune of Ebanga shortly after the village was pillaged…a UN observer mission was attacked, resulting in numerous casualties…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 77

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Intensify demining efforts and destroy stockpiles of landmines under monitoring and verification by UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“Angola signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on December 4, 1997 but has yet to ratify it. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government and UNITA forces have been using anti-personnel landmines.”

--Alex Vines,  *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 34.

“The government, although it signed the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997, maintained its stockpiles and began to lay new “defensive” minefields in Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige, Kuito and in Cabinda. Both sides continued to purchase arms in 1998. The government received new weapons from Bulgaria, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Although the number of sanction-busting flights into UNITA zones declined, they still continued.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on December 4, 1997 but has yet to ratify it. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government and UNITA forces have been using anti-personnel landmines.”

--Alex Vines,  *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 34.

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“Humanitarian deliveries are organized along three corridors…Road transport is particularly difficult…Security is still a significant problem, and transport has to be organized in WFP convoys to several destinations. The threat of mines continues to be a problem. Most of the rail network was destroyed during the hostilities, and has still not been repaired...”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The government, although it signed the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997, maintained its stockpiles and began to lay new “defensive” minefields in Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige, Kuito and in Cabinda. Both sides continued to purchase arms in 1998. The government received new weapons from Bulgaria, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Although the number of sanction-busting flights into UNITA zones declined, they still continued.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 December 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **18** |
| **Demand number:** | **1087.1811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Remove all illegal checkpoints that constitute obstacles to the free circulation of people and goods.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Free circulation of goods and people emerged only haltingly following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. Effectively the country was divided between the two zones of influence of the contending parties…Free circulation was limited by the political division of the country, and by 'controls' that proliferated along roads to demand illegal taxes from traders and travellers, as well as banditry, land mines, the lamentable state of the roads and destruction of bridges.”

**--**UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the 'neutral zones' separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“During November and December 1997, there were persistent tensions, in particular in the Cuango and Lucapa Provinces…as well as Malenje province…the result of banditry and illegal troop movements…The free movement of people and goods continued to be impeded by the checkpoints put up both by the government and UNITA…Checkpoints throughout Kuito and Huila provinces…set up by both the government and UNITA, continue to impede the free movement of people and goods.”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 20-21.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the 'neutral zones' separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“During November and December 1997, there were persistent tensions, in particular in the Cuango and Lucapa Provinces…as well as Malenje province…the result of banditry and illegal troop movements…The free movement of people and goods continued to be impeded by the checkpoints put up both by the government and UNITA…Checkpoints throughout Kuito and Huila provinces…set up by both the government and UNITA, continue to impede the free movement of people and goods.”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 20-21.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1087** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 February 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1098.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Solve the remaining military and other issues and establish the Gov't of Unity and national Reconciliation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“In February 1998, the European Union expressed its concern with the delays in establishing a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 196.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi continued throughout 1997 to remain outside of functional talks towards making final agreements regarding the unity government. Nevertheless, the inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It may be that the replacement of UNAVEM III with MONUA in June I997 was premature as a marker of the passage of the process into a new phase. But there were sound tactical reasons, both local and institutional, for the replacement of what was perceived as a 'peacekeeping force' with an 'observer mission'. The first half of 1997 had, after all, seen the formation of the unity government and the first tangible moves in the creation of a national army. In New York the maintenance of an operation costing $ 1 million a day could not be justified indefinitely.”

**-**-Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi continued throughout 1997 to remain outside of functional talks towards making final agreements regarding the unity government. Nevertheless, the inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1102** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 March 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1102.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Form the Gov't of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on 04/11/1997.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“In February 1998, the European Union expressed its concern with the delays in establishing a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 196.

“Plans for the creation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) have once again been postponed following the failure of UNITA to send their representatives to Luanda for the formation of the GURN on 25 January. This is the second postponement, as the GURN was to have been formed at the end of last year. The delay raises further difficulties for the planned withdrawal of the United Nations mission, which is to be addressed in the next UN Secretary General's report, due out by 10 February.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | **Full or almost full compliance (4)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997 despite the fact that both parties continue to man illegal checkpoints and although UNITA still controlled of large areas of the country and had refused to quarter perhaps as many as 20,000 of its crack troops. In May, fighting between UNITA and Government troops occurred and the international community called upon UNITA to declare its unquartered troops. In response to UNITA intransigence regarding this and other components of the peace process, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions on UNITA in October 1997 which resulted in UNITA severing almost all contacts with MONUA and the Government.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) occurred on 11 April 1997. Nevertheless, UNITA and the government of Angola remained engaged in a semi-state of war during most of 1997 and 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1102** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 March 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1102.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Remove all remaining obstacles to the peace process and implement without delay the remaining military and political aspects of the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation. The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process - in the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations…Angolan…civil society actors including non-governmental organizations…should contemplate their involvement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118

“UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has demanded a formal position of "principal adviser" to the President in the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, with constitutional powers in excess of those normally given to vice-president - the position which was recently the subject of controversy. In a draft law presented to the Government by UNITA, their leader would be given executive powers to co-ordinate the activities in the following ministries: agriculture and rural development; social reintegration; trade; coffee; energy and water; environment; territorial administration; social affairs; ex-servicemen; and information. The UNITA leader would have his main office in Luanda, although his activities could be carried out from anywhere in the country. He would be afforded the position of second personality in terms of protocol and all public events, and would have a diplomatic passport, and other trappings of office such as a state house. This draft law, if agreed by the Joint Commission, would be presented to the National Assembly. This represents another sharp twist in UNITA's position on this issue. Originally Savimbi had been pushing for the position of vice-president. However, when the Angolan Government agreed to this in June 1995 (see APM no.7, vol I), Savimbi prevaricated before eventually rejecting the Government offer on 27 August 1996 (APM no.1 vol III), claiming that he wanted to spend his time working as leader of UNITA. He then went on to demand a constitutional position of leader of the opposition.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“What was the status of the reconciliation process in Angola? a correspondent asked. Mr. Eckhard said the peace process continued to move along at a relatively slow pace, but it was going in the right direction. The United Nations effort was now focusing more on reconstruction, although events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had created a refugee situation which caused the mobilization of Angolan Government troops and fighting in northern Angola. During that time, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, had spoken to both sides and they had assured him they would not let events in the north disrupt the peace process. President dos Santos had given the Secretary-General further assurances during the OAU summit. The United Nations was watching the situation closely, but "it was not blowing the whistle yet". What did the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, say to the Secretary- General? a correspondent asked, adding that there were reports that he was pulling out. Mr. Eckhard said he had not heard those reports. Mr. Beye had contact with Mr. Savimbi when events first developed and he had given the same assurances as the Government that he would not let those events scuttle the peace process. The parties were in the middle of negotiating the terms of the transition of administrative authority to the entire country by the new Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. Mr. Beye was expected to report some time today on further developments.”

--Daily Press Briefing - 5 - 6 June 1997, *Angola UNAVEM III,* “Recent Developments,” New York, United Nations Department of Public Information.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Obstacles continued to be erected by UNITA and the government to the peace process, and multilateral institutions continued to ignore major violations to the peace process and recognize them as impediments to long-lasting peace in Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“The Panel received evidence of significant support provided to UNITA by individuals operating from South Africa…The role played by the De Decker brothers in procuring arms and military equipment for UNITA from Eastern Europe has already been noted. Also important to UNITA's supply chain was a South African/Namibian national operating from South Africa named Johannes Parfirio Parreira…General Jacinto Bandua told the Panel that Parreira had sold 50,000 pairs of military boots to UNITA, as well as socks and vehicles. Parreira is also known to have been involved in smuggling mining equipment, medicine and other commodities to UNITA in exchange for payment in diamonds and indeed to have been at the centre of a network of illicit UNITA suppliers using his air charter company Interstate Airway.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the 'neutral zones' separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Obstacles continued to be erected by UNITA and the government to the peace process, and multilateral institutions continued to ignore major violations to the peace process and recognize them as impediments to long-lasting peace in Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1106** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **16 April 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1106.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete the remaining military aspects of the peace process as well as move ahead with the political tasks.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has demanded a formal position of "principal adviser" to the President in the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, with constitutional powers in excess of those normally given to vice-president - the position which was recently the subject of controversy. In a draft law presented to the Government by UNITA, their leader would be given executive powers to co-ordinate the activities in the following ministries: agriculture and rural development; social reintegration; trade; coffee; energy and water; environment; territorial administration; social affairs; ex-servicemen; and information. The UNITA leader would have his main office in Luanda, although his activities could be carried out from anywhere in the country. He would be afforded the position of second personality in terms of protocol and all public events, and would have a diplomatic passport, and other trappings of office such as a state house. This draft law, if agreed by the Joint Commission, would be presented to the National Assembly. This represents another sharp twist in UNITA's position on this issue. Originally Savimbi had been pushing for the position of vice-president. However, when the Angolan Government agreed to this in June 1995 (see APM no.7, vol I), Savimbi prevaricated before eventually rejecting the Government offer on 27 August 1996 (APM no.1 vol III), claiming that he wanted to spend his time working as leader of UNITA. He then went on to demand a constitutional position of leader of the opposition.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“A UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

A joint, integrated FAA was never accomplished, UNITA was never demobilized, and the military process was never completed.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“There was little sign, though, in June 1997 that Savimbi’s deep ambivalence to the Lusaka process had been overcome.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation. The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process - in the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations…Angolan…civil society actors including non-governmental organizations…should contemplate their involvement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

A joint, integrated FAA was never accomplished, UNITA was never demobilized, and the military process was never completed.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Apply to the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and its members the Agreement concluded on 05/03/95 between the UN and the Gov't of Angola on the Status of UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the end of June I997, the mandate of the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was completed with conditional success, and superseded by the more modestly manned and resourced Observation Mission in Angola (Missao de Observasao das Nasoes Unidas em Angola - MONUA)….The completion of its mandate followed the apparent commitment on the part of UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) to move ahead to the final implementation of the Lusaka Protocol of November I994. By the terms of this protocol, UNITA was to demobilise the greater part of its army and integrate the remainder into the national armed forces (the FAA - Forsas Armadas Angolanas). Already in April, UNITA had complied with a central part of the political requirements of the protocol by inaugurating a new coalition government of national unity with the ruling MPLA-PT (Movimento de Libertasao de Angola - Partido Trabalhista).”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“It may be that the replacement of UNAVEM III with MONUA in June I997 was premature as a marker of the passage of the process into a new phase. But there were sound tactical reasons, both local and institutional, for the replacement of what was perceived as a 'peacekeeping force' with an 'observer mission'. The first half of 1997 had, after all, seen the formation of the unity government and the first tangible moves in the creation of a national army. In New York the maintenance of an operation costing $ 1 million a day could not be justified indefinitely.”

**-**-Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By 28 February 1998 none of the nine specific stages - including demobilising residual forces, legalising UNITA and formalising Savimbi's 'Special Status', extending the state administration into areas previously held by UNITA, disarming the population, and installing the UNITA leadership in Luanda - had been completed. On 11 March they were therefore rescheduled for completion by 1 April after UNITA had rejected MONUA's proposal of 15 March so as to pre-empt the UN Security Council from imposing further sanctions on UNITA for non-completion of its demobilisation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA, and ensure the freedom of movement and the safety of its personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“Security in many areas of the country remained precarious, with continuing tensions mostly the result of armed attacks, often targeting the Angola National Police (ANP) and local government authorities in the countryside. There were also numerous attacks on government posts and vehicles, as well as abductions of personnel. Often the perpetrators were groups of well-armed, unidentified men. The U.N. Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) was also attacked: on March 27, UNITA attacked a MONUA team at Chongoroi, killing one Angolan and injuring three others. Attacks like this appeared intended by UNITA to show that the U.N. presence was still needed beyond April 30, when its mandate was to expire.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On March 24, 1998, in the Cambundi-Catembo region, a United Nations helicopter transporting UN and Angolan government officials was shot at by UNITA rebels. No casualties were reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98032401, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 73

“On 18 February 1998 in the Malanje province, a United Nations helicopter transporting United Nations and Angola government officials in Malanje province was shot at by UNITA rebels. There were no casualties reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98021801, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 71.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On February 18, 1998, in the Malenje province, a United Nations helicopter transporting UN and Angolan government officials was shot at by UNITA rebels. No casualties were reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98021801, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 71

“UNITA continued its aggressions and took hostages when possible…on 24 March 1998, soldiers from UNITA were witnessed in an armed attack on a UN Team Site. The UN Mission Area and Area Residences were looted and destroyed. UN vehicles were stolen. Armed elements of the UNITA army kidnapped two Portuguese shopkeepers. The couple was abducted from the commune of Ebanga shortly after the village was pillaged…a UN observer mission was attacked, resulting in numerous casualties…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 77

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict. Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete the remaining political aspects of the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the end of June I997, the mandate of the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was completed with conditional success, and superseded by the more modestly manned and resourced Observation Mission in Angola (Missao de Observasao das Nasoes Unidas em Angola - MONUA)….The completion of its mandate followed the apparent commitment on the part of UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) to move ahead to the final implementation of the Lusaka Protocol of November I994. By the terms of this protocol, UNITA was to demobilise the greater part of its army and integrate the remainder into the national armed forces (the FAA - Forsas Armadas Angolanas). Already in April, UNITA had complied with a central part of the political requirements of the protocol by inaugurating a new coalition government of national unity with the ruling MPLA-PT (Movimento de Libertasao de Angola - Partido Trabalhista).”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“There was little sign, though, in June 1997 that Savimbi’s deep ambivalence to the Lusaka process had been overcome.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“A UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The political aspects of the peace process were never fully accomplished. Hence the breakdown of the peace process in 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It may be that the replacement of UNAVEM III with MONUA in June I997 was premature as a marker of the passage of the process into a new phase. But there were sound tactical reasons, both local and institutional, for the replacement of what was perceived as a 'peacekeeping force' with an 'observer mission'. The first half of 1997 had, after all, seen the formation of the unity government and the first tangible moves in the creation of a national army. In New York the maintenance of an operation costing $ 1 million a day could not be justified indefinitely.”

**-**-Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The political aspects of the peace process were never fully accomplished. Hence the breakdown of the peace process in 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete the remaining military aspects of the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the end of June I997, the mandate of the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was completed with conditional success, and superseded by the more modestly manned and resourced Observation Mission in Angola (Missao de Observasao das Nasoes Unidas em Angola - MONUA)….The completion of its mandate followed the apparent commitment on the part of UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) to move ahead to the final implementation of the Lusaka Protocol of November I994. By the terms of this protocol, UNITA was to demobilise the greater part of its army and integrate the remainder into the national armed forces (the FAA - Forsas Armadas Angolanas). Already in April, UNITA had complied with a central part of the political requirements of the protocol by inaugurating a new coalition government of national unity with the ruling MPLA-PT (Movimento de Libertasao de Angola - Partido Trabalhista).”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“On September 2 police surrounded and took control of UNITA’s headquarters in Luanda and only allowed supporters of the Valentim faction to enter the building. Senior police officers publicly said that anyone not with the Valentim group was a “political criminal.” The government’s sponsorship of a “new” UNITA was part of its wider strategy of gradually weakening the rebels through military action and cooption. Luanda also embarked on a strategy to build an international cordon sanitaire around UNITA to cut off its supplies. Luanda intervened successfully militarily in Congo-Brazzaville and in the ex-Zaire in 1997 to ensure UNITA could not maintain the significant foothold it had in these countries in the past. Angolan troops remained in Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 and Zambia was also successfully threatened by Luanda with invasion in March unless it stopped UNITA sanction-busting operations on its soil. In August Luanda also reengaged in DRC with troops, tanks, and air support in support of President Kabila. Namibia was always supportive of the government. Human rights violations in Angola increased throughout the year and were at a higher level than 1997. Security in many areas of the country remained precarious, with continuing tensions mostly the result of armed attacks, often targeting the Angola NationalPolice (ANP) and local government authorities in the countryside. There were also numerous attacks on government posts and vehicles, as well as abductions of personnel. Often the perpetrators were groups of well-armed, unidentified men. The U.N. Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) was also attacked: on March 27, UNITA attacked a MONUA team at Chongoroi, killing one Angolan and injuring three others. Attacks like this appeared intended by UNITA to show that the U.N. presence was still needed beyond April 30, when its mandate was to expire. There was a temporary decline in attacks on MONUA after the mandate was extended to June 30. UNITA continued to harass government forces, as if to remind Luanda that it could make the country ungovernable. On March 30 the government warned the U.N. in an open letter that UNITA was preparing for war.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“There was little sign, though, in June 1997 that Savimbi’s deep ambivalence to the Lusaka process had been overcome.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

A joint, integrated FAA was never accomplished, UNITA was never demobilized, and the military process was never completed.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

A joint, integrated FAA was never accomplished, UNITA was never demobilized, and the military process was never completed.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Refrain from any use of force.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Human rights violations in Angola increased throughout the year and were at a higher level than 1997. Security in many areas of the country remained precarious, with continuing tensions mostly the result of armed attacks, often targeting the Angola National Police (ANP) and local government authorities in the countryside. There were also numerous attacks on government posts and vehicles, as well as abductions of personnel. Often the perpetrators were groups of well-armed, unidentified men. The U.N. Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) was also attacked: on March 27, UNITA attacked a MONUA team at Chongoroi, killing one Angolan and injuring three others. Attacks like this appeared intended by UNITA to show that the U.N. presence was still needed beyond April 30, when its mandate was to expire. There was a temporary decline in attacks on MONUA after the mandate was extended to June 30.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“UNITA continued to harass government forces, as if to remind Luanda that it could make the country ungovernable. On March 30 the government warned the U.N. in an open letter that UNITA was preparing for war.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“Armed attacks increased in 1998, forcing thousands of people from the countryside to migrate to urban areas. Incidents such as the pillage of Ngove on April 23 and the killing of eleven policemen in Bembe on April 26 did not increase confidence. In early May, armed bandits attacked villages in the diamond-producing areas around Chica River, Lunda Sul, leaving behind them a trail of deaths. Although UNITA continued to deny its involvement in what often seemed to be well-coordinated attacks, it was clear that many of the offensives were conducted by armed elements directly or indirectly under UNITA control. According to Amnesty International, at least forty people were killed in May, including more than twenty police officers, with dozens of others injured or missing. A number of UNITA officials and sympathizers were targeted in the many acts of violence since April. UNITA claimed that government forces killed seven of its members near Negage on May 6 or 7. Gross human rights abuses, including the killing of local UNITA functionaries in Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte, and Lunda Norte provinces, and harassment of UNITA members, were also reported by MONUA.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both the government of Angola and UNITA engaged in force throughout the year. Human rights violations in Angola increased throughout the year and were at a higher level than 1997

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both the government of Angola and UNITA engaged in force throughout the year. Human rights violations in Angola increased throughout the year and were at a higher level than 1997

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Notify MONUA of any troop movements in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“By October 1997, Angolan troops had moved in to Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda…10,000 people died in this conflict and the Angolan troops then acted quickly against UNITA and Cabindan separatist forces.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 29.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Troops were continually on the move and aggressing the opposing side throughout 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Troops were continually on the move and aggressing the opposing side throughout 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1118** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 June 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1118.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide the Joint Commission complete information regarding all armed personnel under its control in order for them to be verified, disarmed and demobilized in accordance w/the Lusaka Protocol and agreements in the context of the Joint Commission.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In some areas returned to government control, the police were accused by UNITA of using excessive force to disarm civilians; consequently the Joint Commission called on the government in January to halt such disarming, despite popular criticism that the process was proceeding too slowly.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or disarm.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Demilitarisation and demobilisation campaigns have enjoyed varying degrees of success but they remain poorly conceived and incomplete and need to be much more closely related to the particular case of Angola than in the past.”

--Marcus Power, “Patrimonialism and Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economies of War in Angola,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001): 489-502.

“In the subsequent demobilization process, much of the equipment handed in by UNITA was no longer serviceable, and many of the soldiers entering the demobilization camps were reportedly too young or too old to be fighters. Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.”

--Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1998), 105.

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Medium-term compliance** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or disarm.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1127** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **28 August 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1127.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete fully and without delay the remaining aspects of the peace process and refrain from any action leading to new hostilities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“By October 1997, Angolan troops had moved in to Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda…10,000 people died in this conflict and the Angolan troops then acted quickly against UNITA and Cabindan separatist forces.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 29.

“The renewed hostilities in late 1997 and 1998 resulted in fresh flows of refugees into Namibia and Zambia. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 7,000 civilians crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-July to escape fighting. Some 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries were not repatriated because of the delays in implementing the peace accords, along with general insecurity. By September an estimated total of 1.3 million displaced people inside Angola were also unable or unwilling to return to their homes, particularly in rural areas, because of insecurity. From the beginning of 1998, more than 142,000 newly displaced persons were registered by the U.N. and the national displacement of the civilian population spread to areas untouched for several years, such as Kwanza Sul, Namibe, and Cunene provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“By October 1997, Angolan troops had moved in to Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda…10,000 people died in this conflict and the Angolan troops then acted quickly against UNITA and Cabindan separatist forces.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 29.

“The renewed hostilities in late 1997 and 1998 resulted in fresh flows of refugees into Namibia and Zambia. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 7,000 civilians crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-July to escape fighting. Some 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries were not repatriated because of the delays in implementing the peace accords, along with general insecurity. By September an estimated total of 1.3 million displaced people inside Angola were also unable or unwilling to return to their homes, particularly in rural areas, because of insecurity. From the beginning of 1998, more than 142,000 newly displaced persons were registered by the U.N. and the national displacement of the civilian population spread to areas untouched for several years, such as Kwanza Sul, Namibe, and Cunene provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1127** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **28 August 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1127.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Implement immediately obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the end of June I997, the mandate of the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was completed with conditional success, and superseded by the more modestly manned and resourced Observation Mission in Angola (Missao de Observasao das Nasoes Unidas em Angola - MONUA)….The completion of its mandate followed the apparent commitment on the part of UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) to move ahead to the final implementation of the Lusaka Protocol of November I994. By the terms of this protocol, UNITA was to demobilise the greater part of its army and integrate the remainder into the national armed forces (the FAA - Forsas Armadas Angolanas). Already in April, UNITA had complied with a central part of the political requirements of the protocol by inaugurating a new coalition government of national unity with the ruling MPLA-PT (Movimento de Libertasao de Angola - Partido Trabalhista).”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“By October 1997, Angolan troops had moved in to Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda…10,000 people died in this conflict and the Angolan troops then acted quickly against UNITA and Cabindan separatist forces.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 29.

“The renewed hostilities in late 1997 and 1998 resulted in fresh flows of refugees into Namibia and Zambia. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 7,000 civilians crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-July to escape fighting. Some 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries were not repatriated because of the delays in implementing the peace accords, along with general insecurity. By September an estimated total of 1.3 million displaced people inside Angola were also unable or unwilling to return to their homes, particularly in rural areas, because of insecurity. From the beginning of 1998, more than 142,000 newly displaced persons were registered by the U.N. and the national displacement of the civilian population spread to areas untouched for several years, such as Kwanza Sul, Namibe, and Cunene provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Lusaka Protocol was practically an empty promise by late 1997. The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Lusaka Protocol was practically an empty promise by late 1997. The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1127** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **28 August 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1127.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide immediately to the Joint Commission accurate and complete information on its armed personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces. A World Food Program (WFP) convoy was attacked in Uige on September 16, 1997 by unidentified gunmen: nine U.N. trucks were torched, one U.N. employee was killed, and a number of people were injured. The WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks after the incident. The renewed hostilities resulted in fresh flows of refugees into Namibia and Zambia. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 7,000 civilians crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-July to escape fighting. Some 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries were not repatriated because of the delays in implementing the peace accords, along with general insecurity. By September an estimated total of 1.3 million displaced people inside Angola were also unable or unwilling to return to their homes…”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“UNITA had over 70,000 troops mobilized at its disposal…by 1998”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1998,* Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Joint Commission was not made aware of the level of armament of UNITA troops or their intentions and battlefield progress.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces. A World Food Program (WFP) convoy was attacked in Uige on September 16, 1997 by unidentified gunmen: nine U.N. trucks were torched, one U.N. employee was killed, and a number of people were injured. The WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks after the incident. The renewed hostilities resulted in fresh flows of refugees into Namibia and Zambia. The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 7,000 civilians crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-July to escape fighting. Some 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries were not repatriated because of the delays in implementing the peace accords, along with general insecurity. By September an estimated total of 1.3 million displaced people inside Angola were also unable or unwilling to return to their homes…”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“UNITA had over 70,000 troops mobilized at its disposal…by 1998”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1998,* Washington DC: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Joint Commission was not made aware of the level of armament of UNITA troops or their intentions and battlefield progress.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1127** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **28 August 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1127.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA, stop restricting verification activities, refrain from laying mines, and ensure the freedom of movement and the safety of MONUA and other international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“The government, although it signed the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997, maintained its stockpiles and began to lay new “defensive” minefields in Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige, Kuito and in Cabinda. Both sides continued to purchase arms in 1998. The government received new weapons from Bulgaria, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Although the number of sanction-busting flights into UNITA zones declined, they still continued.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola in 1997 and 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The United States State Department reported in November 2001 that UNITA and FAA forces had been laying landmines since December 1999 in the Caprivi and Kavango Regions of Northeast Namibia.”

--U.S. Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States’ Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, page 10.

“By 28 February 1998 none of the nine specific stages - including demobilising residual forces, legalising UNITA and formalising Savimbi's 'Special Status', extending the state administration into areas previously held by UNITA, disarming the population, and installing the UNITA leadership in Luanda - had been completed. On 11 March they were therefore rescheduled for completion by 1 April after UNITA had rejected MONUA's proposal of 15 March so as to pre-empt the UN Security Council from imposing further sanctions on UNITA for non-completion of its demobilisation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Humanitarian deliveries are organized along three corridors…WFP transports food and non-food items on behalf of the whole humanitarian community in Angola. Deliveries by road are currently made to over 200 destinations, originating both from the three ports, and to and from the 11 WFP sub-offices located around the country. Road transport is particularly difficult to organize as the Angolan transport market consists of a large number of small operators, with generally no more than two or three trucks. Road conditions continue to deteriorate as there has been little or no road repair or maintenance, with the exception of some rehabilitation of bridges, since the end of hostilities. The heavy rains of early 1998 have had a negative impact on road conditions in most areas of the country. Security is still a significant problem, and transport has to be organized in WFP convoys to several destinations. The threat of mines continues to be a problem. Most of the rail network was destroyed during the hostilities, and has still not been repaired. Approximately 20 percent of cargo is moved by air to around 15 destinations in the hard to access northern, eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. Most of the airstrips in these locations are in poor condition, limiting access to Hercules aircraft, which are operated under short-term contracts. Where airstrips allow, WFP uses Boeing 727 aircraft, which are chartered on an ad hoc basis.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On March 24, 1998, in the Cambundi-Catembo region, a United Nations helicopter transporting UN and Angolan government officials was shot at by UNITA rebels. No casualties were reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98032401, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 73

“On 18 February 1998 in the Malanje province, a United Nations helicopter transporting United Nations and Angola government officials in Malanje province was shot at by UNITA rebels. There were no casualties reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98021801, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 71.

“The government, although it signed the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997, maintained its stockpiles and began to lay new “defensive” minefields in Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige, Kuito and in Cabinda. Both sides continued to purchase arms in 1998. The government received new weapons from Bulgaria, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Although the number of sanction-busting flights into UNITA zones declined, they still continued.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola in 1997 and 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1127** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **28 August 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1127.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Notify MONUA of any troop movements in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

“During November and December 1997, there were persistent tensions, in particular in the Cuango and Lucapa Provinces…as well as Malenje province…the result of banditry and illegal troop movements…The free movement of people and goods continued to be impeded by the checkpoints put up both by the government and UNITA…Checkpoints throughout Kuito and Huila provinces…set up by both the government and UNITA, continue to impede the free movement of people and goods.”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 20-21.

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the government of Angola or of their intentions or battles with UNITA throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

“During November and December 1997, there were persistent tensions, in particular in the Cuango and Lucapa Provinces…as well as Malenje province…the result of banditry and illegal troop movements…The free movement of people and goods continued to be impeded by the checkpoints put up both by the government and UNITA…Checkpoints throughout Kuito and Huila provinces…set up by both the government and UNITA, continue to impede the free movement of people and goods.”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 20-21.

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the government of Angola or of their intentions or battles with UNITA throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1130** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 September 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1130.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply fully with all the obligations of resolution 1127.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to impose additional measures against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), such as restrictions on the travel of senior members of UNITA

and adult members of their immediate families, the closing of UNITA offices, the prohibition of flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft…From 1993 to 1997 the UN adopted a series of sanctions against UNITA. Among these were a ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127); restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones; freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of illegal diamonds (Resolution 1173). A Sanctions Committee was established but remained largely ineffective against UNITA's constant violations and the complicity of many countries, companies and individual traders. Indeed it was under the sanctions regime that UNITA's diamond sales netted some US$1.72 billion between 1994 and 1998. Its officials travelled unimpeded especially in Africa and continued to be vocal throughout the world through their 'unofficial' representatives.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not fully comply with the obligations of resolution 1127

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to impose additional measures against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), such as restrictions on the travel of senior members of UNITA

and adult members of their immediate families, the closing of UNITA offices, the prohibition of flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft…From 1993 to 1997 the UN adopted a series of sanctions against UNITA. Among these were a ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127); restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones; freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of illegal diamonds (Resolution 1173). A Sanctions Committee was established but remained largely ineffective against UNITA's constant violations and the complicity of many countries, companies and individual traders. Indeed it was under the sanctions regime that UNITA's diamond sales netted some US$1.72 billion between 1994 and 1998. Its officials travelled unimpeded especially in Africa and continued to be vocal throughout the world through their 'unofficial' representatives.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not fully comply with the obligations of resolution 1127

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1135** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 October 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1135.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete fully and without delay the remaining aspects of the peace process and refrain from any action leading to new hostilities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization. Although a new role for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, within the power-sharing structure seemed elusive, the government did incorporate a number of senior members of UNITA into its ministries and into parliament…But the situation increasingly resembled an uncomfortable zone of nem guerra, nem paz: neither war nor peace.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

“The deteriorating security situation led MONUA to withdraw from many of its more remote outposts in mid-1998, disrupting plans for its Division of Political Affairs to have operated at mandated strength with officers stationed in all provinces to verify the normalization of state administration, participate in local conflict-resolution initiatives and provide good offices. The mandate of MONUA was initially extended to June 30. Although the Security Council expressed its intention to take a final decision by June 30 on MONUA’s mandate, size, and organizational structure, the deteriorating security situation forced an extension of the existing mandate to first September 15 and then a further thirty days.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The peace process had become almost entirely derailed by late 1997 in terms of what was occurring on the ground. While talks were still occurring at a high level, it was mostly political rhetoric. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1997 and 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1135** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 October 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1135.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA including full access for verification activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was overseen by the Joint Commission, a body comprising representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA and the so-called Troika of observer states which oversaw the Lusaka agreement…The 'final' timetable agreed by the Joint Commission on 9 January was due for completion on 28 February 1998, more than a year behind the original schedule. On account of the subsequent delays, the Security Council was compelled to extend MONUA's mandate several times, most recently to the end of June.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government and Angola and UNITA did not cooperate fully with MONUA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By 28 February 1998 none of the nine specific stages - including demobilising residual forces, legalising UNITA and formalising Savimbi's 'Special Status', extending the state administration into areas previously held by UNITA, disarming the population, and installing the UNITA leadership in Luanda - had been completed. On 11 March they were therefore rescheduled for completion by 1 April after UNITA had rejected MONUA's proposal of 15 March so as to pre-empt the UN Security Council from imposing further sanctions on UNITA for non-completion of its demobilisation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government and Angola and UNITA did not cooperate fully with MONUA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1135** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 October 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1135.0412** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Notify MONUA of any troop movements in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made aware of the troop movements of the army of the Government of Angola. It was also not fully aware of the violent situation on the ground at this time, and did not perceive the breakdown in the peace process.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made aware of the troop movements of the army of the Government of Angola. It was also not fully aware of the violent situation on the ground at this time, and did not perceive the breakdown in the peace process.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1135** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 October 1997** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1135.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply immediately with the obligations arising out of resolution 1127.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to impose additional measures against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), such as restrictions on the travel of senior members of UNITA

and adult members of their immediate families, the closing of UNITA offices, the prohibition of flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft…From 1993 to 1997 the UN adopted a series of sanctions against UNITA. Among these were a ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127); restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones; freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of illegal diamonds (Resolution 1173). A Sanctions Committee was established but remained largely ineffective against UNITA's constant violations and the complicity of many countries, companies and individual traders. Indeed it was under the sanctions regime that UNITA's diamond sales netted some US$1.72 billion between 1994 and 1998. Its officials travelled unimpeded especially in Africa and continued to be vocal throughout the world through their 'unofficial' representatives.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not comply with resolution 1127.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided to impose additional measures against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), such as restrictions on the travel of senior members of UNITA

and adult members of their immediate families, the closing of UNITA offices, the prohibition of flights of aircraft by or for UNITA, the supply of any aircraft or aircraft components to UNITA and the insurance, engineering and servicing of UNITA aircraft…From 1993 to 1997 the UN adopted a series of sanctions against UNITA. Among these were a ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127); restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones; freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of illegal diamonds (Resolution 1173). A Sanctions Committee was established but remained largely ineffective against UNITA's constant violations and the complicity of many countries, companies and individual traders. Indeed it was under the sanctions regime that UNITA's diamond sales netted some US$1.72 billion between 1994 and 1998. Its officials travelled unimpeded especially in Africa and continued to be vocal throughout the world through their 'unofficial' representatives.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not comply with resolution 1127.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1149** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 January 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1149.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

complete in accordance with the timetable approved by the Joint Commission on 9 January 1998 the implementation of their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol as well as complete the implementation of their obligations under the "Acordos de Paz" (S/22609, annex), and relevant Security Council resolutions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Angola, and in particular UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization. Although a new role for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, within the power-sharing structure seemed elusive, the government did incorporate a number of senior members of UNITA into its ministries and into parliament…But the situation increasingly resembled an uncomfortable zone of nem guerra, nem paz: neither war nor peace.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the Government of Angola, by January 1998, had nearly abandoned all semblance of a functional timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Accords. Political rhetoric was still being made, but the armies were continually engaging in violent hostilities in the rural zone, and Lusaka was all but dead by mid-1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the Government of Angola, by January 1998, had nearly abandoned all semblance of a functional timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Accords. Political rhetoric was still being made, but the armies were continually engaging in violent hostilities in the rural zone, and Lusaka was all but dead by mid-1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1149** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 January 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1149.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take appropriate steps to ensure an environment of confidence and safety in which the UN and humanitarian personnel may carry out their activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“In July 1998 a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered and in some instances completely halted UN and other NGOs efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

“The deteriorating security situation led MONUA to withdraw from many of its more remote outposts in mid-1998, disrupting plans for its Division of Political Affairs to have operated at mandated strength with officers stationed in all provinces to verify the normalization of state administration, participate in local conflict-resolution initiatives and provide good offices. The mandate of MONUA was initially extended to June 30. Although the Security Council expressed its intention to take a final decision by June 30 on MONUA’s mandate, size, and organizational structure, the deteriorating security situation forced an extension of the existing mandate to first September 15 and then a further thirty days.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The deteriorating security situation led MONUA to withdraw from many of its more remote outposts in mid-1998, disrupting plans for its Division of Political Affairs to have operated at mandated strength with officers stationed in all provinces to verify the normalization of state administration, participate in local conflict-resolution initiatives and provide good offices. The mandate of MONUA was initially extended to June 30. Although the Security Council expressed its intention to take a final decision by June 30 on MONUA’s mandate, size, and organizational structure, the deteriorating security situation forced an extension of the existing mandate to first September 15 and then a further thirty days.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“Relief and rehabilitation food aid needs were re-assessed by WFP during the mission, in close consultation with those agencies and government bodies involved in both the delivery and the coordination of humanitarian aid. Discussions were held with NGOs, donors, government bodies and other UN agencies at both national and provincial levels throughout the country…Despite the good climatic conditions of this year and subsequent production increases, a large proportion of the population still remains food insecure…

The total number of people to be provided with humanitarian food assistance, as assessed by the mission, represents a reduction of approximately 25 percent over the 1997 mission estimates. The most important factors influencing this decrease have been the successful resettlement of around 60-80,000 people during 1997/98, primarily in Bengo, Kwanza Sul and Kwanza Norte, and the in accessible and secure areas of Kuando Kubango, Bie, and Moxico provinces…However, the slow pace of normalization of rural administration, delays in the national reconciliation process, and deteriorating security conditions, continue to limit the activities of humanitarian agencies and discourage the majority of the displaced and refugees from returning to their areas of origin. At the time of the mission - just before the main harvest - people have been fleeing from their villages and abandoning their fields due to the deterioration in the security situation…This poor security situation has not only resulted in a postponement of the plans for the return of the majority of the internally displaced and refugees, but also in new population displacements. Furthermore, a number of people who could not return to their areas of origin were temporarily resettled in intermediate locations: these populations are generally unable to attain a satisfactory degree of food security, principally due to a combination of a lack of available land and poor soil fertility in the areas of transitory resettlement…Rehabilitation programmes, for both the social and basic infrastructures, have also been seriously curtailed by the poor security conditions, especially in those areas where the vast majority of the population is due to resettle.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On March 24, 1998, in the Cambundi-Catembo region, a United Nations helicopter transporting UN and Angolan government officials was shot at by UNITA rebels. No casualties were reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98032401, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 73

“On 18 February 1998 in the Malanje province, a United Nations helicopter transporting United Nations and Angola government officials in Malanje province was shot at by UNITA rebels. There were no casualties reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98021801, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 71.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“UNITA continued its aggressions and took hostages when possible…on 24 March 1998, soldiers from UNITA were witnessed in an armed attack on a UN Team Site. The UN Mission Area and Area Residences were looted and destroyed. UN vehicles were stolen. Armed elements of the UNITA army kidnapped two Portuguese shopkeepers. The couple was abducted from the commune of Ebanga shortly after the village was pillaged…a UN observer mission was attacked, resulting in numerous casualties…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 77

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1149** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 January 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1149.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Refrain from any action which might undermine the process of normalization of State administration or lead to new tensions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization. Although a new role for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, within the power-sharing structure seemed elusive, the government did incorporate a number of senior members of UNITA into its ministries and into parliament…But the situation increasingly resembled an uncomfortable zone of nem guerra, nem paz: neither war nor peace.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The deteriorating security situation led MONUA to withdraw from many of its more remote outposts in mid-1998, disrupting plans for its Division of Political Affairs to have operated at mandated strength with officers stationed in all provinces to verify the normalization of state administration, participate in local conflict-resolution initiatives and provide good offices. The mandate of MONUA was initially extended to June 30. Although the Security Council expressed its intention to take a final decision by June 30 on MONUA’s mandate, size, and organizational structure, the deteriorating security situation forced an extension of the existing mandate to first September 15 and then a further thirty days.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“By the end of 1997, however, the UN's optimism was shattered by the recognition that Savimbi had retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. The UN finally conceded that the timetable set for the peace process was unrealistic, particularly in relation to the politically sensitive task of demobilisation and reintegration.”

**--**-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“All trust has been broken between the current leadership of MPLA and UNITA following years of open hostility and illusory peace agreements. The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 finally broke down in 1998...Even if all of the political and military measures outlined in the Protocol had been fulfilled, this would still only represent half the battle in ensuring the successful transition from war to peace. Other ingredients required include economic and social renewal and a more open, participative and responsible governance, involving respect for the rule of law and human rights. If economic regeneration, an extension of basic services and social stabilisation are to occur, there needs to be, at a minimum: a restoration of mutual confidence; free circulation of goods and people; normalisation of a nationwide network of state administration; the demilitarisation of society; and, finally, the removal of mines.”

--UNICEF, *Un futuro de esperanca para as criancas de Angola*, Vol 1, 1998. p. 184

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1149** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 January 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1149.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA including full access for verification activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was overseen by the Joint Commission, a body comprising representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA and the so-called Troika of observer states which oversaw the Lusaka agreement…The 'final' timetable agreed by the Joint Commission on 9 January was due for completion on 28 February 1998, more than a year behind the original schedule. On account of the subsequent delays, the Security Council was compelled to extend MONUA's mandate several times, most recently to the end of June.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither party cooperated with MONUA to vertify their activities.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By 28 February 1998 none of the nine specific stages - including demobilising residual forces, legalising UNITA and formalising Savimbi's 'Special Status', extending the state administration into areas previously held by UNITA, disarming the population, and installing the UNITA leadership in Luanda - had been completed. On 11 March they were therefore rescheduled for completion by 1 April after UNITA had rejected MONUA's proposal of 15 March so as to pre-empt the UN Security Council from imposing further sanctions on UNITA for non-completion of its demobilisation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither party cooperated with MONUA to vertify their activities.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1149** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 January 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1149.0712** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Notify MONUA of any troop movements in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offensive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the government of Angola or of their intentions or battles with UNITA throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the government of Angola or of their intentions or battles with UNITA throughout 1997 and 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete immediately and without conditions the implementation of all remaining obligations under the Peace Accords, the Lusaka Protocol, and SC resolutions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization. Although a new role for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, within the power-sharing structure seemed elusive, the government did incorporate a number of senior members of UNITA into its ministries and into parliament…But the situation increasingly resembled an uncomfortable zone of nem guerra, nem paz: neither war nor peace.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“But just as signing the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 only resulted from significant military advances by the Angolan government, so its implementation depends on the credible threat of resuming those advances, with the endorsement if not the active support of the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both parties had all but ceased to work to implement the Peace Accords by March 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both parties had all but ceased to work to implement the Peace Accords by March 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.0112** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Stop the pattern of delays and linkages.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The year started on a more upbeat note after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos spoke by telephone in December 1997 for the first time in many months, agreeing on January 9 to complete the implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol. The development of a government of national unity, the demobilization of UNITA, and the full restoration of state control over local government was due to be completed on February 28. However, UNITA had not fulfilled its obligations by this time and a new deadline was set for March 16, to be marked by the installation of UNITA’s leadership in Luanda. When UNITA declared on March 6 that it had demilitarized all its forces, the government responded by legalizing UNITA as a political party and appointing three governors and seven vice-governors nominated by UNITA. Both sides also agreed on the list of six ambassadors nominated by UNITA. On March 31, a law granting special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party was promulgated. On April 1, Radio Vorgan, the UNITA radio station, ceased broadcasting. On the same day a UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA can definitely be accused of both delaying and reneging on the Peace Process throughout 1997 and 1998, and because of Jonas Savimbi’s failure to come to functional compromises concerning the structure and function of the Government of Unity and Reconciliation, the Peace Process failed without being even partially implemented since its conception.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

“UNITA continued its aggressions and took hostages when possible…on 24 March 1998, soldiers from UNITA were witnessed in an armed attack on a UN Team Site. The UN Mission Area and Area Residences were looted and destroyed. UN vehicles were stolen. Armed elements of the UNITA army kidnapped two Portuguese shopkeepers. The couple was abducted from the commune of Ebanga shortly after the village was pillaged…a UN observer mission was attacked, resulting in numerous casualties…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 77

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA can definitely be accused of both delaying and reneging on the Peace Process throughout 1997 and 1998, and because of Jonas Savimbi’s failure to come to functional compromises concerning the structure and function of the Government of Unity and Reconciliation, the Peace Process failed without being even partially implemented since its conception.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete immediately obligations in the areas of demobilization of UNITA troops, normalization of State administration, transformation of radio Vorgan, and disarmament of civilian population.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In some areas returned to government control, the police were accused by UNITA of using excessive force to disarm civilians; consequently the Joint Commission called on the government in January to halt such disarming, despite popular criticism that the process was proceeding too slowly.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“On April 1,1998, Radio Vorgan, the UNITA radio station, ceased broadcasting. On the same day a UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“In the subsequent demobilization process, much of the equipment handed in by UNITA was no longer serviceable, and many of the soldiers entering the demobilization camps were reportedly too young or too old to be fighters. Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of his best fighters and most lethal equipment as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.”

--Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1998), 105.

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization. Although a new role for UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, within the power-sharing structure seemed elusive, the government did incorporate a number of senior members of UNITA into its ministries and into parliament…But the situation increasingly resembled an uncomfortable zone of nem guerra, nem paz: neither war nor peace.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By Spring 1998, UNITA troops had not been demobilization, only a small fraction had engaged in the troop quartering and disarming process, perhaps as a false demonstration of goodwill by Savimbi in 1996-1997, state administration was still unstructured without a coherent mission for UNITA representatives, radio Vorgan had returned to the transmission of slanted propaganda, and the civilian population had never been disarmed.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Demilitarisation and demobilisation campaigns have enjoyed varying degrees of success but they remain poorly conceived and incomplete and need to be much more closely related to the particular case of Angola than in the past.”

--Marcus Power, “Patrimonialism and Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economies of War in Angola,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001): 489-502.

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offensive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By Spring 1998, UNITA troops had not been demobilization, only a small fraction had engaged in the troop quartering and disarming process, perhaps as a false demonstration of goodwill by Savimbi in 1996-1997, state administration was still unstructured without a coherent mission for UNITA representatives, radio Vorgan had returned to the transmission of slanted propaganda, and the civilian population had never been disarmed.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Give priority to peaceful actions and refrain from any action that might undermine the process of normalization of State administration or lead to new hostilities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITAw as prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“But just as signing the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 only resulted from significant military advances by the Angolan government, so its implementation depends on the credible threat of resuming those advances, with the endorsement if not the active support of the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New hostilities were emergent throughout 1998. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New hostilities were emergent throughout 1998. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the Nat'l Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordinance and provide information on minefields.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government, although it signed the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997, maintained its stockpiles and began to lay new “defensive” minefields in Luena, Saurimo, Malange, Quibaxe, Uige, Kuito and in Cabinda. Both sides continued to purchase arms in 1998. The government received new weapons from Bulgaria, Russia, and possibly Brazil. Although the number of sanction-busting flights into UNITA zones declined, they still continued.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

“Angola signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on December 4, 1997 but has yet to ratify it. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government and UNITA forces have been using anti-personnel landmines.”

--Alex Vines,  *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 34.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1998 through the recent past, landmines continue to threaten civilians throughouth Angola. The whereabouts of the mines were never carefully documented by either party in the wars in the 1990s, and their explosion proved difficult by de-mining groups hired by the UN.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1998 through the recent past, landmines continue to threaten civilians throughouth Angola. The whereabouts of the mines were never carefully documented by either party in the wars in the 1990s, and their explosion proved difficult by de-mining groups hired by the UN.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1157** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **20 March 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1157.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Move to Luanda as agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi has still not returned to Luanda as required, citing a string of excuses relating to security fears or alleged non-compliance by the Government with its requirements under the Lusaka Protocol. The fact that Savimbi refused to sign the declaration of demobilisation on 6 March sending his deputy, Antonio Dembo in-stead, also precipitated speculation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In 1998 Jonas Savimbi never moved to Luanda. He remained in the rural zone, maintaining secrecy and distance for many years to come.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“I doubt the possibilities for power-sharing in Angola… the kind of partnership which a coalition government would require was not in the cards, given the apparent ideological differences, radically dissimilar personalities, and deep personal animosity which characterized relations between the Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi. The gulf of personal mistrust between the two was so vast as to be probably unbridgeable…I hardly ever attended a meeting with either that did not contain some comment of suspicion or disdain - even contempt - for his rival.”

--Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (New York: St Martin's 1996), 519.

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In 1998 Jonas Savimbi never moved to Luanda. He remained in the rural zone, maintaining secrecy and distance for many years to come.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1164** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 April 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1164.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Implement remaining obligations under the Peace Accords, the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant SC resolutions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“But just as signing the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 only resulted from significant military advances by the Angolan government, so its implementation depends on the credible threat of resuming those advances, with the endorsement if not the active support of the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In December 1998, Angola's sporadic peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In December 1998, Angola's sporadic peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1164** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 April 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1164.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Stop the pattern of delays and linkages and cooperate in completing the normalization of State administration.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“With his control of the lucrative diamond mines in Luanda Province Savimbi has been able to retain his elite troops and continue to stockpile weapons in flagrant contempt of the most basic terms of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. As of 1998, Angola although nominally at peace, remains highly volatile and divided, and many observers fear there may yet be a return to war.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The year started on a more upbeat note after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President dos Santos spoke by telephone in December 1997 for the first time in many months, agreeing on January 9 to complete the implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol. The development of a government of national unity, the demobilization of UNITA, and the full restoration of state control over local government was due to be completed on February 28. However, UNITA had not fulfilled its obligations by this time and a new deadline was set for March 16, to be marked by the installation of UNITA’s leadership in Luanda. When UNITA declared on March 6 that it had demilitarized all its forces, the government responded by legalizing UNITA as a political party and appointing three governors and seven vice-governors nominated by UNITA. Both sides also agreed on the list of six ambassadors nominated by UNITA. On March 31, a law granting special status to Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party was promulgated. On April 1, Radio Vorgan, the UNITA radio station, ceased broadcasting. On the same day a UNITA delegation led by Vice-President General Sebastião Dembo arrived in Luanda to prepare for the reopening of UNITA’s office there on June 1. However, the April 1 deadline for the return of local administrations was missed, with only 80 percent of the 335 localities brought under government control. Eight of the twelve strategic areas set to be handed back to the government were normalized by early June but the key outstanding areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo in the center of the country remained the focus of negotiations. In May, the U.N. submitted a new timetable, calling for the former rebels to hand back the areas by May 31. They did not comply, and UNITA requested more time. On May 31, the U.N. announced that UNITA had proposed that it should hand over the four remaining strongholds by June 25. UNITA again sought a delay in handing over of the four strategic locations, and was given an extra ten days by the U.N. However, on July 1, when UNITA again requested at least two further weeks to withdraw, the U.N. imposed a new package of sanctions on UNITA to try to force compliance. In anticipation of these sanctions UNITA pulled out of the U.N.-chaired Joint Commission for two months in protest; upon its return in August UNITA said it would permit the extension of state administration to the four strongholds by October 15. The government counter-proposed an August 31 deadline; on that date it suspended UNITA from the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on the grounds of non-compliance by UNITA with its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. In a related action, Jorge Valentim, and other UNITA members who had served in the GURN announced a split with Savimbi, launching a party called the Renovation Committee of UNITA. The government stated that it would only negotiate with this “new” UNITA and urged others to do the same.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By April 1998, UNITA was engaged in all-out war with the government’s army and civilian territories allied with them. UNITA was not so much “delaying” peace as rejecting it at this moment.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By April 1998, UNITA was engaged in all-out war with the government’s army and civilian territories allied with them. UNITA was not so much “delaying” peace as rejecting it at this moment.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1164** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 April 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1164.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately stop attacks on MONUA, international personnel and Angolan national authorities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“France is deeply concerned at the deterioration of the situation in Angola in recent weeks. This situation has been marked by an absence of progress in the peace process and by an increased number of armed incidents, including against the United Nations Mission, incidents which the Council has recently condemned...We welcome the efforts made by the Angolan Government to implement the plan, and we also express our satisfaction at the commitment shown by the Angolan Government to pursue the path of political dialogue. We deplore, by contrast, that the UNITA leadership has not lived up to its obligations. This attitude seriously jeopardizes stability in Angola.”

--Government of France, Representative to the United Nations, 12 June 1998 quoted in “The Situation in Angola,” <http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/980612_cs_france_afrique.htm>

“On 16 June 1998, in the Cazombo region of Angola, two United Nations officials were detained by UNITA rebels at their headquarters in Eastern Angola. They were later released. A UN spokesperson said that most of the UN personnel had been evacuated from the area on Monday, 15 June when it became obvious that a UNITA attack was imminent. Attacks by UNITA have escalated since the UN Security Council took steps to freeze all overseas UNITA assets on 12 June.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 82.

“On 19 June 1998, in the Malenje province of Angola, elements of the rebel group UNITA ambushed a United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) vehicle killing a UN interpreter and injuring a military observer and two police officers. The attack occurred at a bridge approximately three miles north of Calandula.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 80.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Random attacks on MONUA personnel occurred sporadically throughout 1998 and 1998 in Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 16 June 1998, in the Cazombo region of Angola, two United Nations officials were detained by UNITA rebels at their headquarters in Eastern Angola. They were later released. A UN spokesperson said that most of the UN personnel had been evacuated from the area on Monday, 15 June when it became obvious that a UNITA attack was imminent. Attacks by UNITA have escalated since the UN Security Council took steps to freeze all overseas UNITA assets on 12 June.”

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“On 19 June 1998, in the Malenje province of Angola, elements of the rebel group UNITA ambushed a United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) vehicle killing a UN interpreter and injuring a military observer and two police officers. The attack occurred at a bridge approximately three miles north of Calandula.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 80.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Random attacks on MONUA personnel occurred sporadically throughout 1998 and 1998 in Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1164** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 April 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1164.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN and international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“France is deeply concerned at the deterioration of the situation in Angola in recent weeks. This situation has been marked by an absence of progress in the peace process and by an increased number of armed incidents, including against the United Nations Mission, incidents which the Council has recently condemned...We welcome the efforts made by the Angolan Government to implement the plan, and we also express our satisfaction at the commitment shown by the Angolan Government to pursue the path of political dialogue. We deplore, by contrast, that the UNITA leadership has not lived up to its obligations. This attitude seriously jeopardizes stability in Angola.”

--Government of France, Representative to the United Nations, 12 June 1998 quoted in “The Situation in Angola,” <http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/980612_cs_france_afrique.htm>

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“In July 1998 a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered and in some instances completely halted UN and other NGOs efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

“On March 24, 1998, in the Cambundi-Catembo region, a United Nations helicopter transporting UN and Angolan government officials was shot at by UNITA rebels. No casualties were reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98032401, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 73

“On 18 February 1998 in the Malanje province, a United Nations helicopter transporting United Nations and Angola government officials in Malanje province was shot at by UNITA rebels. There were no casualties reported.”

--International Terror: Incident Identification Code AFI98021801, cited in Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 71.

“UNITA continued its aggressions and took hostages when possible…on 24 March 1998, soldiers from UNITA were witnessed in an armed attack on a UN Team Site. The UN Mission Area and Area Residences were looted and destroyed. UN vehicles were stolen. Armed elements of the UNITA army kidnapped two Portuguese shopkeepers. The couple was abducted from the commune of Ebanga shortly after the village was pillaged…a UN observer mission was attacked, resulting in numerous casualties…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 77

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 16 June 1998, in the Cazombo region of Angola, two United Nations officials were detained by UNITA rebels at their headquarters in Eastern Angola. They were later released. A UN spokesperson said that most of the UN personnel had been evacuated from the area on Monday, 15 June when it became obvious that a UNITA attack was imminent. Attacks by UNITA have escalated since the UN Security Council took steps to freeze all overseas UNITA assets on 12 June.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 82.

“On 19 June 1998, in the Malenje province of Angola, elements of the rebel group UNITA ambushed a United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) vehicle killing a UN interpreter and injuring a military observer and two police officers. The attack occurred at a bridge approximately three miles north of Calandula.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 80.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1164** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 April 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1164.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Refrain from any action which might undermine the process of normalization of State administration or lead to new tensions, and continue to give priority to peaceful actions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New hostilities were emergent throughout 1998. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New hostilities were emergent throughout 1998. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in 1998 thorughout the Angolan provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate without conditions in the immediate extension of State administration throughout the national territory, and stop attempts to reverse this process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA in no way cooperated with the extension of state administration throughout Angola in 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA in no way cooperated with the extension of state administration throughout Angola in 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete demilitarization and stop attempts to restore military capabilities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA had not demilitarized by this moment, and had no plans to demilitarize as it was engaged in hostil warfare throughout Angola in 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA had not demilitarized by this moment, and had no plans to demilitarize as it was engaged in hostil warfare throughout Angola in 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA in the verification of its demilitarization.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was overseen by the Joint Commission, a body comprising representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA and the so-called Troika of observer states which oversaw the Lusaka agreement…The 'final' timetable agreed by the Joint Commission on 9 January was due for completion on 28 February 1998, more than a year behind the original schedule. On account of the subsequent delays, the Security Council was compelled to extend MONUA's mandate several times, most recently to the end of June.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

At no point did UNITA cooperate with MONUA in demilitarization. UNITA only partially demilitarized in 1996 and retained the majority of its troops to continue warfare throughout the countryside between 1997 and 2002.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

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“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

At no point did UNITA cooperate with MONUA in demilitarization. UNITA only partially demilitarized in 1996 and retained the majority of its troops to continue warfare throughout the countryside between 1997 and 2002.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Stop attacks on personnel of MONUA, international personnel, the authorities of the GURN, and the civilian population.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“France is deeply concerned at the deterioration of the situation in Angola in recent weeks. This situation has been marked by an absence of progress in the peace process and by an increased number of armed incidents, including against the United Nations Mission, incidents which the Council has recently condemned...We welcome the efforts made by the Angolan Government to implement the plan, and we also express our satisfaction at the commitment shown by the Angolan Government to pursue the path of political dialogue. We deplore, by contrast, that the UNITA leadership has not lived up to its obligations. This attitude seriously jeopardizes stability in Angola.”

--Government of France, Representative to the United Nations, 12 June 1998 quoted in “The Situation in Angola,” <http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/980612_cs_france_afrique.htm>

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“In July 1998 a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered and in some instances completely halted UN and other NGOs efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“France is deeply concerned at the deterioration of the situation in Angola in recent weeks. This situation has been marked by an absence of progress in the peace process and by an increased number of armed incidents, including against the United Nations Mission, incidents which the Council has recently condemned...We welcome the efforts made by the Angolan Government to implement the plan, and we also express our satisfaction at the commitment shown by the Angolan Government to pursue the path of political dialogue. We deplore, by contrast, that the UNITA leadership has not lived up to its obligations. This attitude seriously jeopardizes stability in Angola.”

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--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

continue to refrain from any action, including the excessive use of force, which might undermine the process of normalization of State administration, make use of UNITA personnel, as appropriate and in accordance with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, in areas to which State administration is extended, and continue to give priority to peaceful actions that contribute to the successful conclusion of the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The government of Angola and UNITA rebels have shown no interest in halting military operations or returning to the negotiating table. Observing that the peace process in Angola had collapsed and the country found itself in a state of war, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated on 17 January 1999 that MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. By August at least two million people, more than one-sixth of the population, had been forced from their homes by the fighting and at least 200 were dying from starvation each day. A large-scale government offensive was launched on 14 September 1999 against UNITA positions in the provinces of Huambo, Bie, Malanje and Uige. In October 1999 UNITA forces, escaping the Angolan army's offensive against their strongholds of Bailundo and Andulo, moved into Moxico province. By November 1999 the civil war that restarted in June 1998 had spread to almost every major town in Angola.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

“By December 1999 the startling military offensive by the Angolan government reclaimed virtually all the territory it had lost to the UNITA rebels during the previous six months. On 24 December 1999 the Angolan army captured UNITA's former headquarters at Jamba, in south-east of Angola. Jamba -- which served as UNITA's headquarters from 1976 until 1991 -- was created by South Africa and the American CIA and while serving as UNITA's headquarters was carefully camouflaged to protect against air attacks. The other historic UNITA headquarters at Lumbala N'guimbo in Moxico province, was captured by Angolan forces in November 1999.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angolas population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanje in the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000 people respectively.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“The Government of the Republic of Angola expresses its concern at the passivity and complacence [sic] with which the international community witnessed UNITA'S successive failures to implement the Lusaka Protocol, despite the timely denunciations made. This enabled UNITA not only to continue its destabilizing acts, but to re-arm and re-constitute its forces, which were meanwhile converted into regular forces equipped with armoured cars and long-range artillery with great firepower. Those forces are now

estimated to number more than 40 000 men with strategic bases in many parts of the national territory. The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed UNITA'S formal statement that it had completely disarmed and demilitarized its forces.”

--Statement of the Government of Angola, press release in Luanda, 23 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Avoid taking any action which may lead to new hostilities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“In December 1998 the Lusaka protocol collapsed and UNITA resumed armed struggle. The primary cause of the current crisis in Angola was the failure by the leadership of UNITA to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

“In December 1998, Angola’s fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA.”

----Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angolas population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanje in the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000 people respectively.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN and international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“In July 1998 a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered and in some instances completely halted UN and other NGOs efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desis from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 16 June 1998, in the Cazombo region of Angola, two United Nations officials were detained by UNITA rebels at their headquarters in Eastern Angola. They were later released. A UN spokesperson said that most of the UN personnel had been evacuated from the area on Monday, 15 June when it became obvious that a UNITA attack was imminent. Attacks by UNITA have escalated since the UN Security Council took steps to freeze all overseas UNITA assets on 12 June.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 82.

“On 19 June 1998, in the Malenje province of Angola, elements of the rebel group UNITA ambushed a United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) vehicle killing a UN interpreter and injuring a military observer and two police officers. The attack occurred at a bridge approximately three miles north of Calandula.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 80.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desis from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the redeployment of MONUA personnel to support and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

At no point in 1998 did UNITA facilitate in the extension of state administration.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

At no point in the medium-term did UNITA facilitate in the extension of state administration.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1173** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **1173.1911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Designate and notify to the Sanctions Committee the area of Angola to which state administration has not been extended.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Government…notified the committee…Given the ineffectiveness of the Angola sanctions committee in the past, this was a positive start. On May 7 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of two panels of experts to investigate violations…”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 144

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Government…notified the committee…Given the ineffectiveness of the Angola sanctions committee in the past, this was a positive start. On May 7 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of two panels of experts to investigate violations…”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 144

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1176** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **24 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1176.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply fully and unconditionally with obligations in resolution 1173.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A year later, the Security Council adopted resolution 1173 of 12 June 1998 and resolution 1176 of 24 June 1998, prohibiting the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds not controlled through the Certificate of Origin issued by the Government of Angola, as well as imposing financial sanctions on UNITA. By resolution 1237 of 7 May 1999, the Security Council established an independent Panel of Experts to investigate violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA. Following the publication of the Panel's report (document S/2000/203), the Security Council adopted resolution 1295 of 18 April 2000, by which the Panel's recommendations were taken up and a "Monitoring Mechanism" was established to collect additional information and investigate any relevant leads regarding sanctions violations, with a view to enhancing the implementation of the measures imposed on UNITA.”

--“Conflict Diamonds,” Sanctions and War: General Assembly Adopts Resolution on “Conflict Diamonds,” 2000.

“Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA generated up to $3.7 billion from diamonds mined in areas under their control. These diamonds were an integral part of the peace process which began with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. In return for the handover of territory, UNITA demanded guaranteed revenue from diamonds. Probably with justification, UNITA perceived that losing control of diamond bearing territory would leave them vulnerable to an MPLA double cross. Indeed, in 1997 when UNITA was negotiating the handover of territory to the government, Maurice Templesman, boss of diamond trader Lazare Kaplan, and a close confidante of several US Presidents and National Security Advisors, tried to broker a deal between UNITA and the government which would, in effect, have seen UNITA converted into a diamond mining and marketing company. Jonas Savimbi's distrust of the government was probably one of many factors that prevented the Templesman deal going through. However, UNITA was offered control of some mines and entered into joint ventures with De Beers amongst others. UNITA undoubtedly used this period to rearm in preparation for renewed conflict.”

--Patrick Alley with Alex Yearsley, “Diamonds are a war's best friend,” *Southern Africa Report Archive*, vol 15 no 1, 1999.

“The diamond industry was now mandated to cease its purchase of UNITA diamonds. De Beers have repeatedly stated that they have abided by Resolution 1173, most recently in a letter from their Chairman Nicky Oppenheimer to Global Witness on 21st April 1999: "As you know, De Beers has fully committed itself to support UN resolution 1173." In the same letter he states that "The role that diamonds may be playing in prolonging the civil war and suffering in Angola is indeed a matter of grave concern to De Beers." This concern however was not apparent during the bulk of the 1990s when De Beers' annual reports documented their success in buying up Angolan rough diamonds. As De Beers Managing Director Gary Ralfe said in an interview on the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast dated 21st October 1997, "You are absolutely right to say that in fact it is UNITA that has over the recent few years been responsible for most of the production in Angola ... there is no doubt that we buy many of those diamonds that emanate from the UNITA-held areas in Angola, second hand on the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv."

--Patrick Alley with Alex Yearsley, “Diamonds are a war's best friend,” *Southern Africa Report Archive*, vol 15 no 1, 1999.

“The Mechanism considers that UNITA sells its diamonds through three main distinct systems: selling direct to diamond cutters, tenders held in third countries, and through South Africa's small open market. It states that central to UNITA's diamond trade in South Africa is a network of businessmen whose motivation is financial rather than political. The purpose of the new networks is to create new covert channels for UNITA operations, since the older channels have been compromised by exposure. The South African government is moving to implement the certificate of origin scheme, and co-sponsored the resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 December.”

--Final Report on the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, Report presented to the Chairman of the UN Security Council Committee concerning the situation in Angola, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, 21 December 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not comply with resolution 1173.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1992 and 1998, UNITA generated up to $3.7 billion from diamonds mined in areas under their control. These diamonds were an integral part of the peace process which began with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. In return for the handover of territory, UNITA demanded guaranteed revenue from diamonds. Probably with justification, UNITA perceived that losing control of diamond bearing territory would leave them vulnerable to an MPLA double cross. Indeed, in 1997 when UNITA was negotiating the handover of territory to the government, Maurice Templesman, boss of diamond trader Lazare Kaplan, and a close confidante of several US Presidents and National Security Advisors, tried to broker a deal between UNITA and the government which would, in effect, have seen UNITA converted into a diamond mining and marketing company. Jonas Savimbi's distrust of the government was probably one of many factors that prevented the Templesman deal going through. However, UNITA was offered control of some mines and entered into joint ventures with De Beers amongst others. UNITA undoubtedly used this period to rearm in preparation for renewed conflict.”

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--Final Report on the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, Report presented to the Chairman of the UN Security Council Committee concerning the situation in Angola, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, 21 December 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not comply with resolution 1173.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1180** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1180.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Stop any attacks on the personnel of MONUA, int'l personnel, and authorities of GURN.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

“Security in many areas of the country remained precarious, with continuing tensions mostly the result of armed attacks, often targeting the Angola National Police (ANP) and local government authorities in the countryside. There were also numerous attacks on government posts and vehicles, as well as abductions of personnel. Often the perpetrators were groups of well-armed, unidentified men. The U.N. Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) was also attacked: on March 27, UNITA attacked a MONUA team at Chongoroi, killing one Angolan and injuring three others. Attacks like this appeared intended by UNITA to show that the U.N. presence was still needed beyond April 30, when its mandate was to expire.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

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--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1180** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1180.0512** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN and international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“In July 1998 a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. The attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered and in some instances completely halted UN and other NGOs efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 33.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 7 July 1998, in the Uige province of Angola, a seventeen member United Nations team was fired upon by elements of UNITA. Eight shots were fired at a UN helicopter transporting the group to the Toto area to investigate another armed attack by UNITA forces. The helicopter was forced to return to the city of Uige.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 83.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1180** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1180.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate with MONUA in providing full access for its verification activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was overseen by the Joint Commission, a body comprising representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA and the so-called Troika of observer states which oversaw the Lusaka agreement…The 'final' timetable agreed by the Joint Commission on 9 January was due for completion on 28 February 1998, more than a year behind the original schedule. On account of the subsequent delays, the Security Council was compelled to extend MONUA's mandate several times, most recently to the end of June.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In 1998, MONUA repeatedly could not enter UNITA-controlled regions, particularly in diamond-producing centers, as landmine-laying was heavily practiced throughout…”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By 28 February 1998 none of the nine specific stages - including demobilising residual forces, legalising UNITA and formalising Savimbi's 'Special Status', extending the state administration into areas previously held by UNITA, disarming the population, and installing the UNITA leadership in Luanda - had been completed. On 11 March they were therefore rescheduled for completion by 1 April after UNITA had rejected MONUA's proposal of 15 March so as to pre-empt the UN Security Council from imposing further sanctions on UNITA for non-completion of its demobilisation.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1180** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1180.0612** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Notify MONUA of any troop movements in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“According to MONUA in late July, ten of the country’s eighteen provinces were unsafe. The levels of violence by both sides were very high in August, with the national police targeting demobilized soldiers and UNITA officials and burning villages in areas sympathetic to UNITA. There were also abuses during forced recruitment for the Angolan military often of children. Between June and August, the government conscripted males aged fifteen to thirty-four for combat. Extra soldiers were sent to remote areas and unemployed teenagers rounded up and sent for military training. UNITA continued to attack villages and police posts, ambush vehicles, and lay new mines. The increase in military operations resulted in a further rise in reported human rights violations, particularly in Lunda Norte, Malange, and Cabinda provinces. The mass killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group on July 21 and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula in Lunda Norte constituted the most dramatic abuse. Attacks on Cambo-Sungingi and Cunda-Dia-Baze in Malange in August by heavily armed individuals resulted in numerous deaths; at least nine summary executions indicated a growing pattern. In September fighting continued in Malange, Uige, Huambo, and Lunda Norte provinces.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the army of the government of Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government offensive finally came one year later on 4 December 1998. After UNITA had re-occupied a number of districts in the previous months, government forces - apparently with the acquiescence of the international community - attacked UNITA strongholds in Andulo and Bailundo in central Angola. Since it was no secret that a strike was planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offen-sive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. UNITA counter-attacked north and west and laid siege to Huambo, Kuito, and Malanje, three government-held towns.”

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--Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Angola, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

MONUA was not made fully aware of the troop movements of the army of the government of Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1180** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 June 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1180.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Refrain from laying of new mines.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

”On 21 July 1998, a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA rebels. The attack resulted in over one hundred deaths with approximately one hundred persons injured including UN personnel and members of various aid organizations. UN teams were unable to investigate the attack due to freshly laid mines in the area. Many UNITA attacks go unverified because the situation in the affected areas is so dangerous…and the laying of mines prevalent.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 84-85.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola in 1998-2002.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

”On 21 July 1998, a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA rebels. The attack resulted in over one hundred deaths with approximately one hundred persons injured including UN personnel and members of various aid organizations. UN teams were unable to investigate the attack due to freshly laid mines in the area. Many UNITA attacks go unverified because the situation in the affected areas is so dangerous…and the laying of mines prevalent.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 84-85.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola in 1998-2002.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Refrain from any steps which could exacerbate the present situation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply immediately and without conditions w/obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant SC resolution to prevent further deterioration of situation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

New tensions were constantly emerging in 1998. Hostilities were re-emerging with force, and the peace process was stalled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease reoccupation of localities where the State administration was established, and stop attacks on GURN, UN, and international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA did not desist from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own rebel army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Ensure that the practice of the Angolan National Police is consistent w/ the Lusaka Protocol and respects UNITA legal activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angolan police force has clashed with the opposition UNITA forces, killing nearly 27 UNITA men in two separate fightings, the Angolan National Police Headquarters said here in a communique Wednesday. The communique said that seven soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were killed in a fighting near Balombo city in Benguela Province Tuesday when the UNITA soldiers were taking military operations. Another military clash happened around Caala City, 74 km from Huambo, the capital city of central Angola's Huambo Province Sunday, in which 20 UNITA men were killed.”

--“Angolan Police Clashes With UNITA,” Xinhua *English Newswire*, September 9, 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were frequent incidents of violence between the National Police and members of UNITA.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angolan police force has clashed with the opposition UNITA forces, killing nearly 27 UNITA men in two separate fightings, the Angolan National Police Headquarters said here in a communique Wednesday. The communique said that seven soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were killed in a fighting near Balombo city in Benguela Province Tuesday when the UNITA soldiers were taking military operations. Another military clash happened around Caala City, 74 km from Huambo, the capital city of central Angola's Huambo Province Sunday, in which 20 UNITA men were killed.”

--“Angolan Police Clashes With UNITA,” Xinhua *English Newswire*, September 9, 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were frequent incidents of violence between the National Police and members of UNITA.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with MONUA in providing full access for its verification activities and guarantees the safety and freedom of movement of all UN and international personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 3 September 1998, a civilian plane was shot down in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte province by UNITA rebels. Twenty people were killed in the attack. The United Nations decision to withdraw from several Angolan provinces will severely hamper humanitarian assistance to these regions.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 87.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did not stop and perhaps could not stop UNITA from attacking humanitarian convoys, nor could it prevent rogue or decentralized factions of its own army from attacking humanitarian aid workers and shipments. In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1190** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **13 August 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1190.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the new UNSG's Special Representative to Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply immediately and without conditions w/obligations (demilitarization, extension of State administration).

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Withdraw from the territories occupied through military action.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Savimbi is crucial to UNITA's capacity to wage war; apparently, he is reported to be the only one who knows all the details of UNITA's secret fuel dumps, arms caches, and supply routes - information that, in its complete form, is denied to his chief of staff. This report concludes that Savimbi s personal grip means that even the most high-placed defectors cannot give the government precise information. It also means that Savimbi makes a tempting target since his removal would severely weaken UNITA as a fighting force. There are other members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi s actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process…Hence, Savimbi is reluctant to comply with many demands that could be perceived to threaten his position…”

--“Angola: all about power” *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, 5 February 1999

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Transform into a genuine political party dismantling military structure in the context of the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0412** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Reconsider decision to suspend participation of UNITA in the GURN and in the Nat'l Assembly.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Reject military action, pursue dialogue, and refrain from any steps that could exacerbate the situation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, Government of Namibia, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Central to the factors promoting conflict in Angola has been the way in which the war remains fluid and inchoate in many places on the ground and the way in which it has regularly become part of wider, regional conflicts. Although the government has been successful in recent years at driving UNITA from large areas it previously controlled, UNITA's guerrilla army FALA (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola) relies on the country's informal economy, on seizing supplies from the FAA and on a kind of banditry practised for decades. Driven by logistics, fighting tends to be periodic, seasonal and spatially diffuse whilst 'victories' reflect not so much the strength of opposing forces but the weaknesses of their enemy. The administration of territory remains inconsistent and incomplete, sometimes temporary and invariably contested.”

--William Reno, “The Real War Economy of Angola,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (editors), *Angola’s War Economy,* (Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 2000)

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully w/the SG's Special Representative and with other initiatives by member states to bring a peaceful solution to the crisis.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is adamantly opposed to a third. Indeed, President dos Santos has strenuously resisted calls to negotiate and has proclaimed that he will never again speak with Savimbi. The government has for-bidden the international community any contact with Savimbi…Instead, the government has sought to achieve the military victory that has eluded them by throwing out the moderates in the government, initiating yet another costly re-armament programme, and launching the December 1998 offensive.”  
--'Angola: SADC to Underwrite a Peace Deal,” *IRIN*, 14 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Central to the factors promoting conflict in Angola has been the way in which the war remains fluid and inchoate in many places on the ground and the way in which it has regularly become part of wider, regional conflicts. Although the government has been successful in recent years at driving UNITA from large areas it previously controlled, UNITA's guerrilla army FALA (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola) relies on the country's informal economy, on seizing supplies from the FAA and on a kind of banditry practised for decades. Driven by logistics, fighting tends to be periodic, seasonal and spatially diffuse whilst 'victories' reflect not so much the strength of opposing forces but the weaknesses of their enemy. The administration of territory remains inconsistent and incomplete, sometimes temporary and invariably contested.”

--William Reno, “The Real War Economy of Angola,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (editors), *Angola’s War Economy,* (Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 2000)

“In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola’s long history of violent conflict.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angolas population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanje in the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000 people respectively.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1195** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1195.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of the UNSG's Special Representative and all UN and international humanitarian personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Relief and rehabilitation food aid needs were re-assessed by WFP during the mission, in close consultation with those agencies and government bodies involved in both the delivery and the coordination of humanitarian aid. Discussions were held with NGOs, donors, government bodies and other UN agencies at both national and provincial levels throughout the country…Despite the good climatic conditions of this year and subsequent production increases, a large proportion of the population still remains food insecure…

The total number of people to be provided with humanitarian food assistance, as assessed by the mission, represents a reduction of approximately 25 percent over the 1997 mission estimates. The most important factors influencing this decrease have been the successful resettlement of around 60-80,000 people during 1997/98, primarily in Bengo, Kwanza Sul and Kwanza Norte, and the in accessible and secure areas of Kuando Kubango, Bie, and Moxico provinces…However, the slow pace of normalization of rural administration, delays in the national reconciliation process, and deteriorating security conditions, continue to limit the activities of humanitarian agencies and discourage the majority of the displaced and refugees from returning to their areas of origin. At the time of the mission - just before the main harvest - people have been fleeing from their villages and abandoning their fields due to the deterioration in the security situation…This poor security situation has not only resulted in a postponement of the plans for the return of the majority of the internally displaced and refugees, but also in new population displacements. Furthermore, a number of people who could not return to their areas of origin were temporarily resettled in intermediate locations: these populations are generally unable to attain a satisfactory degree of food security, principally due to a combination of a lack of available land and poor soil fertility in the areas of transitory resettlement…Rehabilitation programmes, for both the social and basic infrastructures, have also been seriously curtailed by the poor security conditions, especially in those areas where the vast majority of the population is due to resettle.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

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| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply with obligations (demilitarization, and extension of State administration).

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Central to the factors promoting conflict in Angola has been the way in which the war remains fluid and inchoate in many places on the ground and the way in which it has regularly become part of wider, regional conflicts. Although the government has been successful in recent years at driving UNITA from large areas it previously controlled, UNITA's guerrilla army FALA (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Angola) relies on the country's informal economy, on seizing supplies from the FAA and on a kind of banditry practised for decades. Driven by logistics, fighting tends to be periodic, seasonal and spatially diffuse whilst 'victories' reflect not so much the strength of opposing forces but the weaknesses of their enemy. The administration of territory remains inconsistent and incomplete, sometimes temporary and invariably contested.”

--William Reno, “The Real War Economy of Angola,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (editors), *Angola’s War Economy,* (Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 2000)

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Withdraw from the territories occupied through military action.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Seek a political settlement.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate with the UNSG's Special Representative.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

‘The European Union expresses its grave concern about the persisting impasse in the Angolan peace process and in the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka agreements, which have resulted in a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola. The EU deeply regrets that, in spite of several public appeals, including by the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council, it has not been possible to avoid major fighting in the central part of Angola. Only a political solution through the full and unconditional implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and relevant UNSC Resolutions may bring a lasting peace to Angola and avoid more suffering of her people…Clearly, the main responsibility of this situation is to be attributed to UNITA and its leadership under Dr Savimbi, which has unjustifiably failed to demilitarise its forces and facilitate the extension of State administration throughout the national territory (its main commitments under the Lusaka Protocol), in defiance of the pressing demands of the Security Council and the international community…The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to UNITA to implement unconditionally and without further delay its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. It further urges UNITA to withdraw immediately from territories which it has reoccupied through military or other action…Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine-laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine-laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed…The EU will look at ways to improve the implementation of existing UN sanctions against UNITA and stands ready to consider what further measures against UNITA might be adopted by the UN Security Council.”

-- European Union Bulletin 12-1998, Common foreign and security policy (6/23), European Union statements and presidency statements on behalf of the European Union, 28 December 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

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| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of the UNSG's Special Representative and all UN and international humanitarian personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“On 16 September 1998, a World Food Programme convoy was attacked by armed elements of UNITA. The convoy of twenty-one trucks was being escorted by members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The convoy was carrying food and en route to Uige province when it was attacked. One UN member was killed in the ambush and six others injured. Following the incident the WFP suspended its land convoys for three weeks. As a result of the increasing violence, United Nations efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas have been severely hampered.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 88.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“On 4 November 1998 fifteen military observers assigned to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) were held hostage by UNITA rebels in central Angola. UN planes were prevented from landing and evacuating its personnel from the cities of Andulo and Bailundo, the locations of UNITA’s political and military headquarters. This action by the rebel group is seen as an attempt to use UN personnel as human shields against possible attacks on UNITA strongholds by government forces.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 91.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Civil war in: Angola

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| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Carry out a thorough investigation of the causes of the crash of a Russian civilian aircraft.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

The Security Council this morning strongly condemned the criminal act by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against commercial aircraft -- namely, the shooting down of an Antonov-26 aircraft on 12 May near Luzamba, Angola, the taking hostage of its Russian crew, and the unknown fate of its Angolan passengers.Through a presidential statement, read out by its President, Denis Dangue Rewaka (Gabon), the Council also expressed its grave concern at the fate of those who were onboard the downed aircraft, demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the Russian crew members and all other foreign nationals that might be held hostage by UNITA in Angola, and demanded information on the fate of the Angolan passengers, as well.  The Council stressed that UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi, carry full responsibility for their security…

--Press Release SC/6681, Security Council 4007th Meeting (PM)

“UNITA has claimed that it shot down the aircraft and was holding "three Russian mercenaries", later named as Alexander Zaitsev, Serge Tchesrokov, and Sergy Zaharov. Six Angolans were also on board the aircraft, although there is no information on their fate.

--Angola: Peace Monitor, Volume 9, 2 June 1999, University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center

“In order to defend itself against the murderous fury of José Eduardo dos Santos, on 12th May '99 in the province of Lunda North, the Generalised Popular Resistance forces using the means at its disposal shot down an Antonor-26 military transport airplane on the outskirts of the municipality of Luzamba…Three crew members on the plane, claiming Russian nationality, are being held by UNITA. It should be pointed out that the three men arrived in Angola in January 1999 as mercenaries in José Eduardo dos Santos' war. The following are their identities: a. Alexander Zaitsev, son of Leonid Zaitsev and Maria Zaitsev, born on 6th January 1960. A pilot by profession. b. Serge Tchesrokov, son of Alexander Tchesrokov and Ivan Tchesrokov, born on 9th April 1954. Co-pilot by profession. c. Sergy Zaharov, son of Kamstaten and Liley, born on 23rd August 1955 in Moskva. On board Engineer by profession. The three mercenaries were captured alive and are in good health, being held under the leadership of UNITA. The leadership of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola does not understand why the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the UN Security Council having taken part in the Angolan peace process in the Troika of observer nations, allows its citizens to be sent to Angola as mercenaries to take part in the Eduardo dos Santos' war against the Angolan people.”

--UNITA Communique No. 15/CPM/99, Bailunda, 17 May 1999.

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Anne Richardson, of the DPA News Agency in Luanda Reported that an investigation of this plane crash had shown that it had crash landed after engine failure.”

--Anne Richardson, DPA News Agency, Luanda Angola, 2 July 1999, quoted in Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 52.

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 97-99.

“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1202** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 September 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1202.1612** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the efforts to investigate the Russian plane crash.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999) on Angola…expressed “concern at the delays in the investigations into the downing on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 of two aircraft chartered by the United Nations and the loss under suspicious circumstances of other commercial aircraft over UNITA-controlled areas in Angola…at the end of May, an anonymous document started circulating in Huambo. Much later, the document appeared on a UNITA website: it stated: “The three Russians captured after their Antonov-26 was downed by UNITA are reported in good condition. Russia faces the dilemma of respecting the UN Sanctions – prohibiting contacts with the leadership of UNITA – and seeking the return of its nationals.”

--Leon Kukkuk, *Letters to Gabriella: Angola’s Last War for Peace, What the UN Did and* *Why*, Sarasota, FL: FLF Press, 2005, p. 67

“UNITA claimed that it had “shot down” the Russian aircraft carrying “Chicken”…because in fact it was carrying a “high level military delegation” and war material and that it was shot down near Xa-Muteba…”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 52.

“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 97-99.

“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

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“The Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999) on Angola…expressed “concern at the delays in the investigations into the downing on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 of two aircraft chartered by the United Nations and the loss under suspicious circumstances of other commercial aircraft over UNITA-controlled areas in Angola…at the end of May, an anonymous document started circulating in Huambo. Much later, the document appeared on a UNITA website: it stated: “The three Russians captured after their Antonov-26 was downed by UNITA are reported in good condition. Russia faces the dilemma of respecting the UN Sanctions – prohibiting contacts with the leadership of UNITA – and seeking the return of its nationals.”

--Leon Kukkuk, *Letters to Gabriella: Angola’s Last War for Peace, What the UN Did and* *Why*, Sarasota, FL: FLF Press, 2005, p. 67

“UNITA claimed that it had “shot down” the Russian aircraft carrying “Chicken”…because in fact it was carrying a “high level military delegation” and war material and that it was shot down near Xa-Muteba…”

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“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply with obligations (demilitarization, and extension of State administration.)

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

-- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Withdraw from the territories occupied through military action.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angolas population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanje in the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000 people respectively.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

“On 4 November 1998 fifteen military observers assigned to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) were held hostage by UNITA rebels in central Angola. UN planes were prevented from landing and evacuating its personnel from the cities of Andulo and Bailundo, the locations of UNITA’s political and military headquarters. This action by the rebel group is seen as an attempt to use UN personnel as human shields against possible attacks on UNITA strongholds by government forces.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 91.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999.

“On 14 December 1998, a privately owned plane carrying relief aid to government forces was shot down by UNITA rebels. The plane was en route to Luando when it crashed in UNITA controlled territory, approximately eighteen miles north of Kuito. Rescue operations were hampered by heavy fighting in the area.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 95.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate with MONUA in the withdrawal of MONUA personnel from Andulo and Bailundo.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

-- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999

“On 26 December 1998, a United Nations C130 transport plane was shot down while flying from Huambo to Saurimo. The plane had just delivered supplies and equipment to UN forces in the central highlands when it was attacked, shortly after take-off from the town of Huambo. The plane, with fourteen people on board crashed in the village of Vila Nova. All four crewmen were killed along with ten passengers. Eight of the passengers were part of the MONUA, while two were employed by a private communications firm working for the UN. Search and rescue operations were hampered by heavy fighting between UNITA militants and government forces around the crash site.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000, p. 96.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

-- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the UNSG's Special Representative to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In August 2000, a report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping focused on how local parties sign peace accords for a variety of reasons 'not all of them favourable to peace'. This report focuses on 'spoilers', that is groups (including signatories) who can renege on accords, have independent income sources to buy guns, enrich the leadership and pay soldiers and 'may even have the motive for war' (UN, 2000b). In this context, Savimbi's eligibility to stand in any future election seems extremely problematic.”

--Marcus Power, “Patrimonialism and Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economies of War in Angola,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001): 489-502.

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

-- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of all international humanitarian personnel, cooperate with humanitarian organizations, cease minelaying, and respect humanitarian, refugee, and human rights law.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The 1999 outbreak war has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE.”

---Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

 “Blaming Angola's desperate situation on the rebel UNITA leadership's failure to comply with its obligations under a UN-brokered peace treaty, the Security Council yesterday demanded that UNITA demilitarize and allow the government into areas under rebel control. The council expressed "deep concern" at the deteriorating political, military and humanitarian situation in Angola, including the "critical condition of internally displaced persons," the number of malnourished children and the outbreak of diseases such as polio and meningitis. It also expressed concern about renewed landmine activity.”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“The Angolan government has refused the Security Council's request to open humanitarian corridors to allow aid deliveries. Angolan Foreign Minister Joao Miranda "said there was no need for such measures, because the government itself would ensure the distribution of emergency aid to the estimated 3 million people who need it.”  UNITA rebels have yet to respond to the UN appeal. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi said yesterday that both sides have the resources to fight long enough to destroy Angola if the war continues, but that UNITA is ready for talks with the government.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“The UN's World Food Programme has said it's unable to deliver food aid to more than one-million people because the roads.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“Insufficient relief supplies are being delivered to one of the most desperate areas, Malanje, because "few drivers want to brave the ambushes and landmines on the road to the town during the heaviest fighting and the most intense suffering there has been for years in Angola." Even when supplies reach Malanje, "many of the elderly people are simply too weary to cook the United Nations food handouts." Finding firewood "means braving the guns and landmines just outside the town."”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“Relief and rehabilitation food aid needs were re-assessed by WFP during the mission, in close consultation with those agencies and government bodies involved in both the delivery and the coordination of humanitarian aid. Discussions were held with NGOs, donors, government bodies and other UN agencies at both national and provincial levels throughout the country…Despite the good climatic conditions of this year and subsequent production increases, a large proportion of the population still remains food insecure…

The total number of people to be provided with humanitarian food assistance, as assessed by the mission, represents a reduction of approximately 25 percent over the 1997 mission estimates. The most important factors influencing this decrease have been the successful resettlement of around 60-80,000 people during 1997/98, primarily in Bengo, Kwanza Sul and Kwanza Norte, and the in accessible and secure areas of Kuando Kubango, Bie, and Moxico provinces…However, the slow pace of normalization of rural administration, delays in the national reconciliation process, and deteriorating security conditions, continue to limit the activities of humanitarian agencies and discourage the majority of the displaced and refugees from returning to their areas of origin. At the time of the mission - just before the main harvest - people have been fleeing from their villages and abandoning their fields due to the deterioration in the security situation…This poor security situation has not only resulted in a postponement of the plans for the return of the majority of the internally displaced and refugees, but also in new population displacements. Furthermore, a number of people who could not return to their areas of origin were temporarily resettled in intermediate locations: these populations are generally unable to attain a satisfactory degree of food security, principally due to a combination of a lack of available land and poor soil fertility in the areas of transitory resettlement…Rehabilitation programmes, for both the social and basic infrastructures, have also been seriously curtailed by the poor security conditions, especially in those areas where the vast majority of the population is due to resettle.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998.

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

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| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1213** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1213.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Ensure the safety, security, and freedom of movement of MONUA personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1219** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1219.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Respond to the appeals from the UN and guarantee the security and access necessary, and assist in, the search and rescue of survivors of aircrafts disappeared over UNITA territory.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“The armed conflict between government forces and UNITA rebels intensified, resulting in major rebel losses. UNITA was cleared out of its strongholds in the highland towns of Andulo and Bailundo and lost a vast territory to government forces. Thousands were killed in the fighting, a major increase from the estimated conflict deaths during 1998…Aircraft downed in UNITA regions often resulted in death, hostage-taking, and executions of foreign nationals.”

--Armed Conflicts Report, Ploughshares, September 2003.

“UNITA has lost all its former bases, including its more recent headquarters in the central highland towns of Andulo and Bailundo two months ago.”

--*Guardian Weekly*, Jan. 6-12, 2000

“The conventional military capacity built up UNITA since it pledged to disarm in 1994 has been severely damaged, leaving questions about whether it can operate as a single military force. However, senior Angolan military officers recognize that the capacity for UNITA to continue as a dangerous guerrilla force remains…The Chief of Staff of the Angolan Army, General Joao De Matos, speaking in Catumbela on 18 December, said that UNITA no longer has the capacity to take control of the country by force. He claimed that UNITA had lost more than 80% of its fighting capacity, with the army seizing from the rebels 15, 000 tonnes of weapons, munitions and other equipment, 27 tanks, 7 artillery emplacements, 30 missiles, and hundreds of vehicles.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor*, December 21, 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 2000, The Angolan government gained control of 92 percent of Angola (11 out of 13 districts by September) after a series of back-to-back victories and the capture of the UNITA leader’s headquarters at Jamba. Though seriously weakened and no longer posing a threat to the entire country, UNITA increased its use of landmines and continued hit and run attacks in much of the countryside, including within areas considered to be government strongholds. There were reports that the Namibian army has joined the Angolan conflict, its army fighting alongside the Angolan army which also was reportedly engaged in forced recruitment of Namibian men and women to fight against the rebels. Namibia’s involvement has in turn heightened tensions in Zambia, where UNITA bandits searching for food have attacked villages.”

--Armed Conflicts Report, Ploughshares, September 2003.

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1219** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1219.0212** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate in fulfillment of its expressed commitment to do so.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“UNITA from mid 1999 has sustained a number of heavy military defeats at the hands of the government, including being repulsed from attacking the northern city of Uige at the end of June 2001. Second, the government has received substantial payments estimated at US$900 million from oil companies enabling it to buy even more military equipment. Oil companies…are also pressing for an end to the war. Third, international sanctions against UNITA intended to drive it to the negotiating table and to isolate Jonas Savimbi has achieved greater impetus since the appointment of Robert Fowler, the Canadian chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in 1999…Of late Luanda's rhetoric on Savimbi being a war criminal who would be put on trial has softened to allowing him to enter the democratic process after demilitarisation.”

-- Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001), 537-547

“The Angolan army has seized the UNITA rebel base at Jamba, for years the headquarters of the guerrillas’ leader, Jonas Savimbi...the fall of Jamba gives government forces almost complete control of Angola’s southern border, further restricting UNITA’s avenues for retreat in the face of its worst defeats in more than a decade."

--*Guardian Weekly*, 12 January 2000

"With the complicity and collaboration of Namibian authorities, the Angolan army is using deceit and force to conscript Rundu’s young men and women into a foreign army, according to peasants, political organizers and clergy here. They say the forced recruitment began last December, when the Namibian government allowed the Angolan military to use Namibian soil for its stepped-up attacks on retreating insurgents as part of an armed offensive that began last September."

-- *Guardian Weekly,* 2-8 March 2000

"The Angolan Armed Froces (FAA) have continued to make gains against Jonas Savimbi’s military remnants. Fighting has continued along the eastern border with Zambia, and there have been reports that this has spilled over into Zambian territory."

*--Angola Peace Monitor,* 10 June 2000.

"The Angolan army, FAA have made further territorial gains against Jonas Savimbi’s rebel movement - UNITA. The government now claims to control 92 percent of Angola’s 157 districts, including eleven of the 13 districts in the two main diamond producing provinces of Lunda Sul and Lunda Notre."

--*The Angola Peace Monitor*, 26 July 2000

"However, the rebels have also continued to attack people and property in the government-controlled areas. UNITA are no longer in a position to threaten to take over the country, but by making much of the country unsafe they are succeeding in their campaign to deny hundreds of thousands of people the right to live in their homes and work their land."

-- Angola Peace Monitor, 1 September, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan army has seized the UNITA rebel base at Jamba, for years the headquarters of the guerrillas’ leader, Jonas Savimbi...the fall of Jamba gives government forces almost complete control of Angola’s southern border, further restricting UNITA’s avenues for retreat in the face of its worst defeats in more than a decade."

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--*The Angola Peace Monitor*, 26 July 2000

"However, the rebels have also continued to attack people and property in the government-controlled areas. UNITA are no longer in a position to threaten to take over the country, but by making much of the country unsafe they are succeeding in their campaign to deny hundreds of thousands of people the right to live in their homes and work their land."

-- Angola Peace Monitor, 1 September, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1219** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **3 December 1998** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1219.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Facilitate an investigation into the fate of the crews and passengers of the aircrafts disappeared over territory controlled by UNITA.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

-- Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 97-99.

“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999.

“The Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999) on Angola…expressed “concern at the delays in the investigations into the downing on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 of two aircraft chartered by the United Nations and the loss under suspicious circumstances of other commercial aircraft over UNITA-controlled areas in Angola…at the end of May, an anonymous document started circulating in Huambo. Much later, the document appeared on a UNITA website: it stated: “The three Russians captured after their Antonov-26 was downed by UNITA are reported in good condition. Russia faces the dilemma of respecting the UN Sanctions – prohibiting contacts with the leadership of UNITA – and seeking the return of its nationals.”

--Leon Kukkuk, *Letters to Gabriella: Angola’s Last War for Peace, What the UN Did and* *Why*, Sarasota, FL: FLF Press, 2005, p. 67

“UNITA claimed that it had “shot down” the Russian aircraft carrying “Chicken”…because in fact it was carrying a “high level military delegation” and war material and that it was shot down near Xa-Muteba…”

Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* New York: Human Rights Watch Press, 1999, p. 52.

“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

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--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1221** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 January 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **1** |
| **Demand number:** | **1221.0111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

demands that all such attacks [on aircraft chartered by the United Nations] cease immediately.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

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“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1996 and 1999…Russian aircraft flew between Zaire, Swaziland, and government-controlled regions of Angola delivering…shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition…Furthermore, in 1998, President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters…four Ilyushin -76s, and six Anotov-12 planes…An agreement between the Government of Angola and the Russian Federation included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.”

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“UNITA claimed that it has been concerned with the bi-weekly flights into Luanda by Russian Anotov-132 planes delivering assorted weaponry.”

--Marcus Scheuemaier, *Economist Intelligence Unit,* London, 26 April 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1221** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 January 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **1221.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with and facilitate an investigation of the downing of two aircrafts chartered by the UN and the loss of other commercial aircrafts over UNITA controlled territory.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1999…armed firing and rocket attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles…aircraft…and humanitarian agency transports increased. UNITA military forces targeted foreign as well as local aircraft carriers.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1999…armed firing and rocket attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles…aircraft…and humanitarian agency transports increased. UNITA military forces targeted foreign as well as local aircraft carriers.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1221** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 January 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1221.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate immediately in the search for and rescue of survivors of disappeared aircrafts.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council this afternoon reiterated its demand that the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Jonas Savimbi, cooperate immediately and in good faith in the search for survivors of recent crashes of United Nations and other commercial aircraft in UNITA-controlled territory. Unanimously adopting resolution 1221 (1999), the Council concluded that Mr. Savimbi had not complied with its demands, contained in resolution 1219 (1998) of 31 December 1998, that he immediately respond to United Nations appeals and guarantee security and access in the search and rescue efforts. (The United Nations lost two chartered planes on 26 December 1998 and 2 January respectively, while four other commercial aircraft are missing.) The Council condemned the downing of the two United Nations planes, deplored the loss under suspicious circumstances of the other commercial aircraft and demanded that all such attacks cease immediately. It reaffirmed its resolve to establish the truth about the circumstances of the tragic incidents and to determine responsibility for them through an immediate and objective international investigation. It reiterated its call upon all concerned, especially UNITA, to cooperate fully and to facilitate the investigation. The Council also asked the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to support the investigation as soon as conditions on the ground permitted. Member States with investigative capability and expertise were also urged to similarly assist the United Nations. By other terms of the resolution, the Council expressed its readiness to pursue reports of violations of the measures previously imposed against UNITA and to take steps to reinforce their implementation.”

--United Nations Press Release SC/6625, 13 January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo. ... In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

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--United Nations Press Release SC/6625, 13 January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1221** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 January 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1221.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue to cooperate with the UN search and rescue efforts.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since 20 January 1999, the rebel-army of Jonas Savimbi has moved its attention to the north of Angola following its failure to take control of the strategically and historically important cities of Huambo and Cuito. At the beginning of December UNITA launched a heavy attack on the two cities in the Central Highlands, using newly acquired tanks and armoured personnel carriers (see APM no.4 vol V). The offensive on the two cities has now been stopped and UNITA troops have been pushed back out of firing range. For a period the rebels were using medium range artillery to shell the two cities. Cuito was particularly badly hit, suffering shelling for 25 days. More than 150 people were killed and 500 injured by the shelling. However, a government army (FAA) counter-offensive has pushed the rebels away from the cities. The safety zone around Huambo is now between 48 and 64 km and FAA has retaken the key town of Tchikala-Tchilohanga (formerly known as Vila Nova). The town, one of UNITA's key bases, lies close to the crossroads at Bela Vista, which leads to Bailundo. Heavy fighting has continued over this strategically important area. FAA have also retaken Chiloda, Cantao, Catama and Chipeta - which are near Cuito. Cunhinga, 30km from Cuito is under FAA control. FAA report that it has destroyed a UNITA base at Ceilunga, 15 km north east of Cuito. Military sources in Luanda claim that three key UNITA special forces units were destroyed in the battle for Cuito. Rumours are circulating that the head of UNITA's rebel forces, General Bock, has been demoted following the defeat. In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA divisions widen. Divisions have widened between the three groups of UNITA supporters in Angola - Jonas Savimbi's militarist wing, Euginio Manuvakola's UNITA-Renovada, and Abel Chivukuvuku's supporters amongst UNITA's parliamentarians. UNITA-Renovada has claimed authority over the UNITA parliamentary group through its control of UNITA's Provisional Directorate. On 24 December it suspended the former leader of the UNITA parliamentary group, Abel Chivukuvuku, on the grounds of "obstructionist behaviour". The Provisional Directorate also suspended UNITA parliamentarians Isaias Samakuva, Daniel Jose Domingos and Celestino Capapelo.UNITA-Renovada broke away from Jonas Savimbi in September 1998. Since then there has been a power struggle between it and the majority of the UNITA parliamentarians. Most of them continue to support Abel Chivukuvuku and object to the imposition of Eugenio Manuvakola as their titular leader…”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Since 20 January 1999, the rebel-army of Jonas Savimbi has moved its attention to the north of Angola following its failure to take control of the strategically and historically important cities of Huambo and Cuito. At the beginning of December UNITA launched a heavy attack on the two cities in the Central Highlands, using newly acquired tanks and armoured personnel carriers (see APM no.4 vol V). The offensive on the two cities has now been stopped and UNITA troops have been pushed back out of firing range. For a period the rebels were using medium range artillery to shell the two cities. Cuito was particularly badly hit, suffering shelling for 25 days. More than 150 people were killed and 500 injured by the shelling. However, a government army (FAA) counter-offensive has pushed the rebels away from the cities. The safety zone around Huambo is now between 48 and 64 km and FAA has retaken the key town of Tchikala-Tchilohanga (formerly known as Vila Nova). The town, one of UNITA's key bases, lies close to the crossroads at Bela Vista, which leads to Bailundo. Heavy fighting has continued over this strategically important area. FAA have also retaken Chiloda, Cantao, Catama and Chipeta - which are near Cuito. Cunhinga, 30km from Cuito is under FAA control. FAA report that it has destroyed a UNITA base at Ceilunga, 15 km north east of Cuito. Military sources in Luanda claim that three key UNITA special forces units were destroyed in the battle for Cuito. Rumours are circulating that the head of UNITA's rebel forces, General Bock, has been demoted following the defeat. In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1229** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **26 February 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1229.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate with the UN humanitarian assistance activities and guarantee the security and freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Hundreds of thousands of Angolans have fled to government controlled cities in the face of an all-out assault by the UNITA rebel movement. Food and essential medical supplies are running out in the cities of Huambo, Cuito and Malanje following the influx of terrified refugees. According to a World Food Programme estimate, there are 70,000 refugees in Malanje; 80,000 in Huambo; and 55,000 in Cuito. A recent survey in Malanje indicated that ten per cent of the local population were suffering from malnutrition. Most of the refugees fled with few possessions, and the situation is deteriorating rapidly. World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo… In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Blaming Angola's desperate situation on the rebel UNITA leadership's failure to comply with its obligations under a UN-brokered peace treaty, the Security Council yesterday demanded that UNITA demilitarize and allow the government into areas under rebel control. The council expressed "deep concern" at the deteriorating political, military and humanitarian situation in Angola, including the "critical condition of internally displaced persons," the number of malnourished children and the outbreak of diseases such as polio and meningitis. It also expressed concern about renewed landmine activity.”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“The Angolan government has refused the Security Council's request to open humanitarian corridors to allow aid deliveries. Angolan Foreign Minister Joao Miranda "said there was no need for such measures, because the government itself would ensure the distribution of emergency aid to the estimated 3 million people who need it.”  UNITA rebels have yet to respond to the UN appeal. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi said yesterday that both sides have the resources to fight long enough to destroy Angola if the war continues, but that UNITA is ready for talks with the government.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“The UN's World Food Programme has said it's unable to deliver food aid to more than one-million people because the roads.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“Insufficient relief supplies are being delivered to one of the most desperate areas, Malanje, because "few drivers want to brave the ambushes and landmines on the road to the town during the heaviest fighting and the most intense suffering there has been for years in Angola." Even when supplies reach Malanje, "many of the elderly people are simply too weary to cook the United Nations food handouts." Finding firewood "means braving the guns and landmines just outside the town."”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“The 1999 outbreak war has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE.”

----Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Humanitarian deliveries are organized along three corridors…WFP transports food and non-food items on behalf of the whole humanitarian community in Angola. Deliveries by road are currently made to over 200 destinations, originating both from the three ports, and to and from the 11 WFP sub-offices located around the country. Road transport is particularly difficult to organize as the Angolan transport market consists of a large number of small operators, with generally no more than two or three trucks. Road conditions continue to deteriorate as there has been little or no road repair or maintenance, with the exception of some rehabilitation of bridges, since the end of hostilities. The heavy rains of early 1998 have had a negative impact on road conditions in most areas of the country. Security is still a significant problem, and transport has to be organized in WFP convoys to several destinations. The threat of mines continues to be a problem. Most of the rail network was destroyed during the hostilities, and has still not been repaired. Approximately 20 percent of cargo is moved by air to around 15 destinations in the hard to access northern, eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. Most of the airstrips in these locations are in poor condition, limiting access to Hercules aircraft, which are operated under short-term contracts. Where airstrips allow, WFP uses Boeing 727 aircraft, which are chartered on an ad hoc basis.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“Hundreds of thousands of Angolans have fled to government controlled cities in the face of an all-out assault by the UNITA rebel movement. Food and essential medical supplies are running out in the cities of Huambo, Cuito and Malanje following the influx of terrified refugees. According to a World Food Programme estimate, there are 70,000 refugees in Malanje; 80,000 in Huambo; and 55,000 in Cuito. A recent survey in Malanje indicated that ten per cent of the local population were suffering from malnutrition. Most of the refugees fled with few possessions, and the situation is deteriorating rapidly. World Food Programme flights in Angola were suspended at the end of December after the first UN transport plane was shot down after leaving Huambo (see separate story). All flights into Cuito airport were stopped due to the shelling of the city, although the airport reopened on 4 January. Roads into Huambo and Cuito have been cut by the intense fighting. Until WFP flights were suspended, the UN organisation was making 20 flights every week, taking 350 tonnes on each flight. WFP resumed its flights on 13 January, taking food to the towns of Luena, Uige/Negage, Ndalantando, Benguela, Lubango, Menongue, N'Zaji and Saurimo… In another important development, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Martin Griffiths arrived in Luanda on 14 January to assess future humanitarian operations. The need for a commitment by all forces to respect humanitarian aid operations was highlighted in the UN Secretary General's report, which warned of the need to "allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations". The future in Angola looks bleak, as December saw the beginning of the harvesting season. Crops will rot if farmers have fled to government-controlled towns. It will soon be time to sow next season's crops.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1229** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **26 February 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1229.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with and facilitate an international investigation of the aircraft incidents.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA divisions widen. Divisions have widened between the three groups of UNITA supporters in Angola - Jonas Savimbi's militarist wing, Euginio Manuvakola's UNITA-Renovada, and Abel Chivukuvuku's supporters amongst UNITA's parliamentarians. UNITA-Renovada has claimed authority over the UNITA parliamentary group through its control of UNITA's Provisional Directorate. On 24 December it suspended the former leader of the UNITA parliamentary group, Abel Chivukuvuku, on the grounds of "obstructionist behaviour". The Provisional Directorate also suspended UNITA parliamentarians Isaias Samakuva, Daniel Jose Domingos and Celestino Capapelo.UNITA-Renovada broke away from Jonas Savimbi in September 1998. Since then there has been a power struggle between it and the majority of the UNITA parliamentarians. Most of them continue to support Abel Chivukuvuku and object to the imposition of Eugenio Manuvakola as their titular leader…”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Since 20 January 1999, the rebel-army of Jonas Savimbi has moved its attention to the north of Angola following its failure to take control of the strategically and historically important cities of Huambo and Cuito. At the beginning of December UNITA launched a heavy attack on the two cities in the Central Highlands, using newly acquired tanks and armoured personnel carriers (see APM no.4 vol V). The offensive on the two cities has now been stopped and UNITA troops have been pushed back out of firing range. For a period the rebels were using medium range artillery to shell the two cities. Cuito was particularly badly hit, suffering shelling for 25 days. More than 150 people were killed and 500 injured by the shelling. However, a government army (FAA) counter-offensive has pushed the rebels away from the cities. The safety zone around Huambo is now between 48 and 64 km and FAA has retaken the key town of Tchikala-Tchilohanga (formerly known as Vila Nova). The town, one of UNITA's key bases, lies close to the crossroads at Bela Vista, which leads to Bailundo. Heavy fighting has continued over this strategically important area. FAA have also retaken Chiloda, Cantao, Catama and Chipeta - which are near Cuito. Cunhinga, 30km from Cuito is under FAA control. FAA report that it has destroyed a UNITA base at Ceilunga, 15 km north east of Cuito. Military sources in Luanda claim that three key UNITA special forces units were destroyed in the battle for Cuito. Rumours are circulating that the head of UNITA's rebel forces, General Bock, has been demoted following the defeat. In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA divisions widen. Divisions have widened between the three groups of UNITA supporters in Angola - Jonas Savimbi's militarist wing, Euginio Manuvakola's UNITA-Renovada, and Abel Chivukuvuku's supporters amongst UNITA's parliamentarians. UNITA-Renovada has claimed authority over the UNITA parliamentary group through its control of UNITA's Provisional Directorate. On 24 December it suspended the former leader of the UNITA parliamentary group, Abel Chivukuvuku, on the grounds of "obstructionist behaviour". The Provisional Directorate also suspended UNITA parliamentarians Isaias Samakuva, Daniel Jose Domingos and Celestino Capapelo.UNITA-Renovada broke away from Jonas Savimbi in September 1998. Since then there has been a power struggle between it and the majority of the UNITA parliamentarians. Most of them continue to support Abel Chivukuvuku and object to the imposition of Eugenio Manuvakola as their titular leader…”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“Since 20 January 1999, the rebel-army of Jonas Savimbi has moved its attention to the north of Angola following its failure to take control of the strategically and historically important cities of Huambo and Cuito. At the beginning of December UNITA launched a heavy attack on the two cities in the Central Highlands, using newly acquired tanks and armoured personnel carriers (see APM no.4 vol V). The offensive on the two cities has now been stopped and UNITA troops have been pushed back out of firing range. For a period the rebels were using medium range artillery to shell the two cities. Cuito was particularly badly hit, suffering shelling for 25 days. More than 150 people were killed and 500 injured by the shelling. However, a government army (FAA) counter-offensive has pushed the rebels away from the cities. The safety zone around Huambo is now between 48 and 64 km and FAA has retaken the key town of Tchikala-Tchilohanga (formerly known as Vila Nova). The town, one of UNITA's key bases, lies close to the crossroads at Bela Vista, which leads to Bailundo. Heavy fighting has continued over this strategically important area. FAA have also retaken Chiloda, Cantao, Catama and Chipeta - which are near Cuito. Cunhinga, 30km from Cuito is under FAA control. FAA report that it has destroyed a UNITA base at Ceilunga, 15 km north east of Cuito. Military sources in Luanda claim that three key UNITA special forces units were destroyed in the battle for Cuito. Rumours are circulating that the head of UNITA's rebel forces, General Bock, has been demoted following the defeat. In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1237** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 May 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1237.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate in a full and timely manner with the expert panels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA, Key Defectors from UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city. In Luena, Moxico province, the safety perimeter around the town has shrunk to 10-15 km following UNITA attacks. In Benguela province, fighting has been centred over the town of Balombo, where thousands of refugees have fled from UNITA. More than 5,000 people have recently fled to Caxito in Bengo province from Cuanza Norte. The number of refugees in the town is now 23,000. There have been reports that in the far south, UNITA is re-occupying bases along the Namibian-Angolan border which it had abandoned following the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords in 1994.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“UNITA arsenal unveiled. The recent fighting in Angola has brought to light the full scale of the weapons at UNITA's disposal.The fighting around Cuito revealed for the first time that UNITA were in possession of T-55 tanks. These tanks, made in the Ukraine, were operated by Ukrainian mercenaries. Sources in FAA estimate that 90 tanks were brought into Andulo and Bailundo by air. It has been independently confirmed that UN observers in Andulo were not allowed to monitor the nightly flights into the town's airstrip. Some commentators have questioned the acceptability of monitors being so severely restricted, and compared the situation unfavourably with the response to restrictions placed on UN personnel in Iraq. ...There have been persistent allegations, though so far unproven, that weapons have been transhipped through Uganda. The UN news agency, IRIN, reported on 21 December that a London-based Angolan specialist claimed that "arms for UNITA have been going through Kampala for a very long time, organised by South African arms dealers. Whether there is any actual support for UNITA by (President) Museveni is unknown."

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

“UNITA has admitted to murdering four workers at the diamond mine being run by Ashton Mining on 6 January. Two Angolan security guards, and a British and a Brazilian mining official were killed in an ambush near the mining town of Luzamba. DiamondWorks, whose Yetwene mine was attacked by UNITA on 8 November, during which 8 people died and 10 others were kidnapped, is said to be losing $2 million a month as a result of the attack. The government's diamond company, Endiama, has admitted that the war is holding back diamond production. ... Endiama estimates that diamond production in 1998 amounted to $430 million, but only $180 million were generated by the formal sector.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In the north of the country UNITA forces have been advancing towards the town of Soyo and the capital of Zaire Province - Mbanza Congo. UNITA has been attacking Dundo, Lucapa and Camissobo in Lunda Norte province. The Angolan government alleges that UNITA plans to destroy the hydroelectric dam at Luachimo, which supplies electricity to Chitato, Cambulo, Lucapa and Dundo. Malanje city has been under heavy bombardment by UNITA, and hundreds have been killed and injured. It is reported that there is a severe shortage of blood supplies. Much of Malanje province is under rebel control, with reports that the rebels have set up a base at Cazundo, 8 km from Malanje city. In Luena, Moxico province, the safety perimeter around the town has shrunk to 10-15 km following UNITA attacks. In Benguela province, fighting has been centred over the town of Balombo, where thousands of refugees have fled from UNITA. More than 5,000 people have recently fled to Caxito in Bengo province from Cuanza Norte. The number of refugees in the town is now 23,000. There have been reports that in the far south, UNITA is re-occupying bases along the Namibian-Angolan border which it had abandoned following the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords in 1994.”

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“UNITA arsenal unveiled. The recent fighting in Angola has brought to light the full scale of the weapons at UNITA's disposal.The fighting around Cuito revealed for the first time that UNITA were in possession of T-55 tanks. These tanks, made in the Ukraine, were operated by Ukrainian mercenaries. Sources in FAA estimate that 90 tanks were brought into Andulo and Bailundo by air. It has been independently confirmed that UN observers in Andulo were not allowed to monitor the nightly flights into the town's airstrip. Some commentators have questioned the acceptability of monitors being so severely restricted, and compared the situation unfavourably with the response to restrictions placed on UN personnel in Iraq. ...There have been persistent allegations, though so far unproven, that weapons have been transhipped through Uganda. The UN news agency, IRIN, reported on 21 December that a London-based Angolan specialist claimed that "arms for UNITA have been going through Kampala for a very long time, organised by South African arms dealers. Whether there is any actual support for UNITA by (President) Museveni is unknown."

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--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 5, Vol. V 22nd January 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1237** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 May 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1237.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the expert panels in carrying out their mandate.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, Government of Namibia**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Monitoring Mechanism built on the groundbreaking work of the Panel of Experts, which on 15 March 2000 published its report to the UN Security Council, exposing how individuals and governments helped UNITA build a formidable arsenal in return for rough diamonds (see APM no.7 Vol. VI). The Mechanism endorsed the thorough recommendations made by the Panel of Experts, and reiterated its proposal that the UN Security Council should consider applying sanctions against any government found to be intentionally violating them. This would make action against Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire a possibility. The Mechanism was formed in July 2000, with the mandate to follow up leads initiated by the Panel of Experts, collect new information and investigate leads, and develop a mechanism to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of sanctions on UNITA. It got off to a slow start due to wrangling over its role, but in the final months of its investigations it made considerable headway in uncovering links between UNITA and the international trade in diamonds and arms. However, it reports that in many cases information was received too late to be thoroughly investigated and analysed. In other cases, requests for information were still outstanding.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA, Issue no.4, Vol. VII, 5th January 2001

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Monitoring Mechanism built on the groundbreaking work of the Panel of Experts, which on 15 March 2000 published its report to the UN Security Council, exposing how individuals and governments helped UNITA build a formidable arsenal in return for rough diamonds (see APM no.7 Vol. VI). The Mechanism endorsed the thorough recommendations made by the Panel of Experts, and reiterated its proposal that the UN Security Council should consider applying sanctions against any government found to be intentionally violating them. This would make action against Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire a possibility. The Mechanism was formed in July 2000, with the mandate to follow up leads initiated by the Panel of Experts, collect new information and investigate leads, and develop a mechanism to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of sanctions on UNITA. It got off to a slow start due to wrangling over its role, but in the final months of its investigations it made considerable headway in uncovering links between UNITA and the international trade in diamonds and arms. However, it reports that in many cases information was received too late to be thoroughly investigated and analysed. In other cases, requests for information were still outstanding.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA, Issue no.4, Vol. VII, 5th January 2001

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1237** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 May 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1237.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with and facilitate an investigation of the downing of two aircrafts chartered by the UN, the loss of other commercial aircrafts over UNITA controlled territory, as well as the crash in Cote d'Ivoire of the aircraft carrying the SG's Special.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Growing concern over UN air crashes--The Troika of Observer States to the Angolan Peace Process - Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States on 18 January released a statement which, inter alia, called on the Angolan government to facilitate UN access to the crash sites of the two UN aircraft brought down near Huambo city in December 1998 and January 1999. UN investigation teams have previously visited both crash sites, but due to fighting in the area their investigations were cut short. However, they did find that the flight recorders were removed from the aircraft, and that attempts had been made to camouflage the aircraft shells. It is widely accepted that UNITA shot down the two aircraft. Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee, interviewed several UNITA defectors during his visit to Angola in January, and heard accounts of how Jonas Savimbi had personally ordered the shooting down of the two aircraft. The Troika statement also bemoans that "over 18 months have passed since the tragic loss of United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General, Alioune Blondin Beye, and that the UN and the families of the deceased have yet to receive a final report on the tragic events of 26 June, 1998, and thus call upon the Government of Cote d'Ivoire to produce a report of its findings as soon as possible". Maitre Beye's chartered twin-turboprop Beechcraft 200 aircraft crashed 50 km east of the Ivorian capital, Abidjan, on a flight from Togo. Blondin Beye met Jonas Savimbi the day before he left Angola for Togo, and was said to be "visibly upset" following the meeting. On 25 June the UN Security Council imposed a new set of sanctions on UNITA, and UNITA's Standing Committee of the Political Commission responded on the same day warning: "let the proponent of these dates, the mediator, be responsible and held accountable". It is understood that crash investigators were dispatched from the United Nations, the United States (country of origin), South Africa (country of registration) and Ivory Coast (country of accident). The United Nations promised in June 1998 to set up a Board of Inquiry to thoroughly examine all aspects of the incident, and that the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) would be requested to assist the Board. On 23 December 1999 the President of Ivory Coast, Henri Konan Bedie, a key international Savimbi supporter, was replaced in a military take-over. The new President, General Robert Guei, is thought to be keen on improving relations with Angola. ...”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa), Issue no. 6, Vol. VI 23rd February 2000

“Over the last month there have been no major gains by either army, although both sides have claimed territorial and tactical advances. In the present situation it is almost impossible to get independent verification of military claims. However, it is known that UNITA has advanced to within firing range of Cuito, and that it has forced the Angolan army, FAA, to retreat from the UNITA stronghold of Andulo after heavy fighting at Triunfo, 14km away. ...Neither side has so far achieved its short-term objectives. UNITA has failed to seize control of Huambo or Cuito, whilst FAA has not been able to take control of Andulo and Bailundo. Tension in the diamond-rich Lunda region is high, with sporadic guerilla attacks on diamond mines and government-controlled towns. Analysts suggest that UNITA is likely to open another front in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, where it is estimated to have 1,500 soldiers. Tension is already high in the province following the kidnapping of five workers of an oil support firm. The police assume it to have been the work of one of the separatist movements operating in the province. The province is an important centre for Angola's oil industry, although oil production is all based offshore. Overall, battle lines are moving back and forward, with neither side gaining the upper hand. Sources in Angola suggest that UNITA troops are well-armed and trained, but are facing shortages of food. Many government soldiers are poorly trained and armed, although it is understood that steps have been taken to address this. Military analysts suggest that the coming dry season, along with the withdrawal of thousands of Angola's most trained soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo, may tip the balance in favour of the government in the long-term.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign Issue no.7, Vol. VI 26th June 1999

“Relations between the neighbouring states of Angola and Zambia have deteriorated to an all-time low following persistent allegations that highly-placed officials in the Zambian government are helping UNITA get arms into, and smuggle diamonds out of, Angola. The heightened tensions are spilling over into the Zambian domestic political scene, with ten local journalists being arrested and bombs being planted in the capital.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign Issue no.7, Vol. VI 26th June 1999

“Various diplomatic sources have claimed that a series of bomb blasts that rocked the Zambian capital on 28 February is directly linked to the tensions between the two countries. Up to a dozen explosions hit Lusaka, and cut electricity and water for several hours. An explosion inside the Angolan embassy resulted in the death of an Angolan security guard. Some analysts suggest that the explosions were designed as a warning by the Angolan government to its Zambian counterpart to keep out of Angolan affairs, and point to the fact that one of the explosions was actually inside the Angolan embassy. A UNITA statement sent to Reuters blamed the Angolan government for the attacks. Other independent analysts have suggested that UNITA may lie behind the attacks, to speed up the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries. The Angolan government has criticised Zambia for failing to protect its Embassy. According to Angolan ambassador to Zambia, Manuel Augusto, a bomb was planted in the office of one of Angola's first secretaries, and virtually destroyed the building.”

--Angola Peace Monitor Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign Issue no.7, Vol. VI 26th June 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Growing concern over UN air crashes--The Troika of Observer States to the Angolan Peace Process - Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States on 18 January released a statement which, inter alia, called on the Angolan government to facilitate UN access to the crash sites of the two UN aircraft brought down near Huambo city in December 1998 and January 1999. UN investigation teams have previously visited both crash sites, but due to fighting in the area their investigations were cut short. However, they did find that the flight recorders were removed from the aircraft, and that attempts had been made to camouflage the aircraft shells. It is widely accepted that UNITA shot down the two aircraft. Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee, interviewed several UNITA defectors during his visit to Angola in January, and heard accounts of how Jonas Savimbi had personally ordered the shooting down of the two aircraft. The Troika statement also bemoans that "over 18 months have passed since the tragic loss of United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General, Alioune Blondin Beye, and that the UN and the families of the deceased have yet to receive a final report on the tragic events of 26 June, 1998, and thus call upon the Government of Cote d'Ivoire to produce a report of its findings as soon as possible". Maitre Beye's chartered twin-turboprop Beechcraft 200 aircraft crashed 50 km east of the Ivorian capital, Abidjan, on a flight from Togo. Blondin Beye met Jonas Savimbi the day before he left Angola for Togo, and was said to be "visibly upset" following the meeting. On 25 June the UN Security Council imposed a new set of sanctions on UNITA, and UNITA's Standing Committee of the Political Commission responded on the same day warning: "let the proponent of these dates, the mediator, be responsible and held accountable". It is understood that crash investigators were dispatched from the United Nations, the United States (country of origin), South Africa (country of registration) and Ivory Coast (country of accident). The United Nations promised in June 1998 to set up a Board of Inquiry to thoroughly examine all aspects of the incident, and that the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) would be requested to assist the Board. On 23 December 1999 the President of Ivory Coast, Henri Konan Bedie, a key international Savimbi supporter, was replaced in a military take-over. The new President, General Robert Guei, is thought to be keen on improving relations with Angola. ...”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa), Issue no. 6, Vol. VI 23rd February 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1237** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 May 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1237.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate with the UN humanitarian assistance activities and guarantee the security and freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

 “Blaming Angola's desperate situation on the rebel UNITA leadership's failure to comply with its obligations under a UN-brokered peace treaty, the Security Council yesterday demanded that UNITA demilitarize and allow the government into areas under rebel control. The council expressed "deep concern" at the deteriorating political, military and humanitarian situation in Angola, including the "critical condition of internally displaced persons," the number of malnourished children and the outbreak of diseases such as polio and meningitis. It also expressed concern about renewed landmine activity.”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“The Angolan government has refused the Security Council's request to open humanitarian corridors to allow aid deliveries. Angolan Foreign Minister Joao Miranda "said there was no need for such measures, because the government itself would ensure the distribution of emergency aid to the estimated 3 million people who need it.”  UNITA rebels have yet to respond to the UN appeal. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi said yesterday that both sides have the resources to fight long enough to destroy Angola if the war continues, but that UNITA is ready for talks with the government.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“The adoption of guerrilla tactics has given Unita the military initiative…This style of warfare also makes it more difficult for the army to strike at Unita's bases, and easier for the rebels to adapt and regroup when attacked…Humanitarian shipments are threatened continuously...Although Unita is believed still to posses tanks and other heavy weaponry, its current guerrilla campaign appears to have been waged entirely with portable weapons, such as mortars and rocket launchers. Despite international sanctions, Unita is still estimated to be earning $100m a year from illegal diamond sales. The military research company, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, says the rebels are continuing to purchase arms from brokers based elsewhere in Southern Africa. But the rebels also retain substantial weapons stockpiles within Angola. They have replenished their stocks during raids on military bases, and there are also reports of weapons intended for the use of the army being diverted instead to Unita.”

--Justin Pearce, “Analysis: UNITA’S Changing tactics,” BBC News, 3 July 2001.

“The UN's World Food Programme has said it's unable to deliver food aid to more than one-million people because the roads.”

--“World: Africa : UN Increases Pressure on Angola,” *BBC News,* 25 August 1999.

“Insufficient relief supplies are being delivered to one of the most desperate areas, Malanje, because "few drivers want to brave the ambushes and landmines on the road to the town during the heaviest fighting and the most intense suffering there has been for years in Angola." Even when supplies reach Malanje, "many of the elderly people are simply too weary to cook the United Nations food handouts." Finding firewood "means braving the guns and landmines just outside the town."”

--“Security Council Demands UNITA Rebels Disarm,” *United Nations Foundation UN WIRE,* Wednesday, August 25, 1999

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

In Angola, 27 years of civil war between the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) movement were tentatively ended by a ceasefire signed on 4 April 2002. The last phase of the war (1998-2002), characterised by “scorched earth” military strategies and an international embargo imposed on areas held by UNITA, rendered large areas of Angola inaccessible to international relief organisations.

--Thomas Grein, Francesco Checci, “Mortality Among Displaced Former UNITA members and their families in Angola: A Retrospective Cluster Survey,” Briitsh Medical Journal, 20 September 2003.

“The 1999 outbreak war has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE.”

----Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect…humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios…The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations, insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Humanitarian deliveries are organized along three corridors…WFP transports food and non-food items on behalf of the whole humanitarian community in Angola. Deliveries by road are currently made to over 200 destinations, originating both from the three ports, and to and from the 11 WFP sub-offices located around the country. Road transport is particularly difficult to organize as the Angolan transport market consists of a large number of small operators, with generally no more than two or three trucks. Road conditions continue to deteriorate as there has been little or no road repair or maintenance, with the exception of some rehabilitation of bridges, since the end of hostilities. The heavy rains of early 1998 have had a negative impact on road conditions in most areas of the country. Security is still a significant problem, and transport has to be organized in WFP convoys to several destinations. The threat of mines continues to be a problem. Most of the rail network was destroyed during the hostilities, and has still not been repaired. Approximately 20 percent of cargo is moved by air to around 15 destinations in the hard to access northern, eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. Most of the airstrips in these locations are in poor condition, limiting access to Hercules aircraft, which are operated under short-term contracts. Where airstrips allow, WFP uses Boeing 727 aircraft, which are chartered on an ad hoc basis.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1268** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 October 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1268.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Ensure the safety, security, and freedom of movement of the United Nations and associated personnel and fully respect their status.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Phillip Sibanda, Zimbabwe National Army, [Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000](http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/Contents.html)

“Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for…humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1998 the Angolan incidents of international terrorism were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel, and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control.”

--Frank Shanty, Raymond Piquet, *International Terrorism: An Annual “Event Data” Report 1998,* Collingdale, PA: COBRA Institute Publishing, Inc, 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1268** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 October 1999** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1268.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Conclude a status of mission agreement with the UNSG as soon as possible.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After successfully stopping the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)'s March 1999 offensive, UNITA escalated its military operations and brought them, as in 1992, closer to the capital city. Thus, on 20 July 1999 UNITA rebels mounted a daring and surprise attack on the town of Catete, just 60km from Luanda.”

--“War in Angola,” *Africa News*, 30 July 1999.

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since 1999, government officials have given prospective dates for multiparty elections for late 2001, late 2002. Another postponement was signalled when on 23 August 2001 President dos Santos announced at an MPLA Congress that he would not stand when elections were held: “If the [electionls] are held in 2002 or 2003, we have a year and a half or two and a half years for a party to ready its candidate for the battle…. The message President dos Santos was making is that there will be elections, but that these may not be in the next two years.”

--Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001), 537-547

“As of June 1999, UNITA has the upper hand and the Angolan army is largely on the defensive…Even the Angolan president is seeking support from his regional allies to deal with UNITA.”

--Report to the Angolan parliament, MPLA Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Jose Ribeiro Neco, quoted in Chris McGreal, 'Profits fuel Angola's war', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1999, p 3.

“In June 1999, Angolan Deputy Minister of Defence, Armado Cruz Neto, confirmed that the FAA was 'preparing for a decisive offence against UNITA' and repeated his government's intention to “wipe out” the rebels.”

--Xinhua News Agency, 'Angolan army to launch massive attack against rebels', 13 July 1999

“on 14 September 1999, Angolan government forces, supported by massive numbers of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, and MiG and Su fighter bombers, attacked on four fronts: Northern Front, from Uige towards UNITA administered towns. Malanje Front, a two-pronged offensive from Malanje and Caculama, and from Malanje and Mussende towards Andulo. Bie Front, a two-pronged offensive from Kuito and Chipeta towards Catabola; and from Camacupaan Vouga towards Andulo. Huambo Front, a two-pronged offensive from Mbave, and from Vila Nova and Chiumbo towards Bailundo.”

-- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: “Angola: UNITA reports government offensive on four fronts,” 19 September 1999

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1295** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **18 April 2000** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1295.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Implement additional internal controls and inspection procedures ensure compliance with measures in resolution 864 regarding oil, and inform the Sanctions Committee of the steps taken in this regard.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The resources simply provide the Angolan government and UNITA with the means to promote their particular agendas. Oil and diamonds afford both sides access to a range of material resources and political connections beyond the borders of Angola. Oil is a key component in the regime's ability to gain access to international political and material resources; not just to markets (as with diamonds) but also to 'diplomatic channels and more politically connected commercial networks that directly advance the MPLA's security strategy'”

--William Reno, “The Real War Economy of Angola,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (editors), *Angola’s War Economy,* (Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 2000)

“UNITA from mid 1999 has sustained a number of heavy military defeats at the hands of the government, including being repulsed from attacking the northern city of Uige at the end of June 2001. Second, the government has received substantial payments estimated at US$900 million from oil companies enabling it to buy even more military equipment. Oil companies…are also pressing for an end to the war. Third, international sanctions against UNITA intended to drive it to the negotiating table and to isolate Jonas Savimbi has achieved greater impetus since the appointment of Robert Fowler, the Canadian chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in 1999…Of late Luanda's rhetoric on Savimbi being a war criminal who would be put on trial has softened to allowing him to enter the democratic process after demilitarisation.”

-- Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001), 537-547

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Oil is the main source of the government's revenue. Between 1995-1999, oil revenues comprised approximately 70 to 89 per cent of government revenues and approximately 85 to 92 per cent of exports, according to the IMF. In 2000, oil accounted for US$3.26 billion of government revenue. In 2001 the Angolan government announced that oil revenues would account for 90.5 per cent of the current year's budget, or approximately US$3.18 billion. As Angola's war winds down, and defence expenditures decline there is increasing international interest in stricter fiscal management and transparency by the Angolan government. On 3 April 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government announced the beginning of a Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) which included a provision to monitor oil revenues known as the 'Oil Diagnostic'. This potentially could have marked a limited positive first step toward promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance in Angola. The World Bank and government of Angola supervised the Oil Diagnostic and, KPMG, an international accounting and consulting firm, implemented it.”

--Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001), 537-547

“Last week (Monday 25 March 2002), Global Witness unveiled an in-depth report into Angolan oil sleaze - ‘All the Presidents’ Men’ - which showed how the economic and political disorder from the war has been exploited to embezzle Angola’s oil revenues through unaccountable bank loans, kickbacks on arms trafficking and a highly over-priced military procurement process. The report showed that between US$1-3 billion, between one-third to one-half of all state income - went missing from the Angolan State in 2001…International oil companies, such as ChevronTexaco, TotalFinaElf and ExxonMobil, are complicit in this process because, although they routinely provide information about their tax payments in developed countries, they refuse to publish what they pay to the Angolan Government.”

--“Angolan Peace Accord Offers Chance to Break Cycle of Natural Resources Funding Conflict,” Global Witness Report, 04/04/2002

“UNITA from mid 1999 has sustained a number of heavy military defeats at the hands of the government, including being repulsed from attacking the northern city of Uige at the end of June 2001. Second, the government has received substantial payments estimated at US$900 million from oil companies enabling it to buy even more military equipment. Oil companies…are also pressing for an end to the war. Third, international sanctions against UNITA intended to drive it to the negotiating table and to isolate Jonas Savimbi has achieved greater impetus since the appointment of Robert Fowler, the Canadian chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in 1999…Of late Luanda's rhetoric on Savimbi being a war criminal who would be put on trial has softened to allowing him to enter the democratic process after demilitarisation.”

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--Steve Kibble and Alex Vines, “Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90 (2001), 537-547

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

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| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1295** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **18 April 2000** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1295.1612** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide member states with full details of the Certificate of Origin scheme and brief the Sanctions Committee on this scheme.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Whilst welcoming the progress towards setting up an international Certificate of Origin scheme for diamonds, and recognising the significant reduction of the scale of UNITA diamond production, the report strongly underlines that "the Mechanism is in no doubt that UNITA still has access to diamond mines and that UNITA still maintains a diamond stockpile". The report stresses the link between UNITA's survival and diamonds, stating that "an Interpol analysis of probable UNITA airstrips places each one close to a UNITA mining area, suggesting continuing close links between UNITA's logistics and diamond trading". ... The report states that "UNITA's diamond production is estimated to have been $800 million in 1996 and $600 million in 1997. When UNITA withdrew from the Cuango Valley it is said to have taken a stockpile of $250 million". The reports states that "the De Beers central selling organisation bought the majority of the diamonds produced" [this refers to diamonds produced before the United Nations placed international sanctions on buying diamonds from UNITA]. ... The Mechanism states that "an overall figure of $3 billion [for diamonds mined by UNITA] between 1993 and 1998 inclusive is not far-fetched, though not all of this accrued to UNITA directly". De Beers now gives a guarantee that none of its diamonds are sourced from conflict zones, and has closed down its African buying offices, but the Mechanism points out that there is "no external validation of the De Beers claim". The Mechanism also points out that it "has received information that major dealers, some of them well known clients of De Beers, are knowingly buying rough diamonds from UNITA, and in some cases, have been operating buying offices along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo since the beginning of 2000, buying Angolan diamonds without a certificate of origin". “

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA, Issue no.4, Vol. VII, 5th January 2001

“The Mechanism considers that UNITA sells its diamonds through three main distinct systems: selling direct to diamond cutters, tenders held in third countries, and through South Africa's small open market. It states that central to UNITA's diamond trade in South Africa is a network of businessmen whose motivation is financial rather than political. The purpose of the new networks is to create new covert channels for UNITA operations, since the older channels have been compromised by exposure. The South African government is moving to implement the certificate of origin scheme, and co-sponsored the resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 December. The Mechanism researched the trade statistics for diamonds and found anomalies which require further investigation. In particular, diamonds with the provenance of Togo, Zambia, Rwanda and Uganda were highlighted. Only Zambia mines any diamonds, and those would be of a much lower value than those declared. ... The Mechanism reports that the Belgian diamond industry and government "are taking considerable care to implement the UN sanctions ... All diamonds enter the Diamond Office and the parcels are checked for conformity to import procedures. At the Diamond Office, a "watchlist" for diamonds is now in place, which lists 15 "sensitive" African countries whose diamonds might include those produced by UNITA or the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone".”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA, Issue no.4, Vol. VII, 5th January 2001

“The report points out that UNITA continue to mine, albeit on a much smaller scale. UNITA is also likely to have a small but high value stockpile, concentrating on the better stones. The Mechanism points out that "a strategy of mining and stockpiling high-value stones would ensure that UNITA can always find buyers". The Mechanism considers that UNITA sells its diamonds through three main distinct systems: selling direct to diamond cutters, tenders held in third countries, and through South Africa's small open market. It states that central to UNITA's diamond trade in South Africa is a network of businessmen whose motivation is financial rather than political. The purpose of the new networks is to create new covert channels for UNITA operations, since the older channels have been compromised by exposure. The South African government is moving to implement the certificate of origin scheme, and co-sponsored the resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 1 December.”

--Final Report on the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, Report presented to the Chairman of the UN Security Council Committee concerning the situation in Angola, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, 21 December 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The report states that "UNITA's diamond production is estimated to have been US$ 800 million in 1996 and US$ 600 million in 1997. When UNITA withdrew from the Cuango Valley it is said to have taken a stockpile of US$ 250 million". The reports states that "the De Beers central selling organisation bought the majority of the diamonds produced" [this refers to diamonds produced before the United Nations placed international sanctions on buying diamonds from UNITA]. However, as "UNITA's mining rights were based on force majeure" UNITA's large-scale industrial mining in the Cuango Valley was effectively "the world's largest diamond smuggling operation". The Mechanism states that "an overall figure of $3 billion [for diamonds mined by UNITA] between 1993 and 1998 inclusive is not far-fetched, though not all of this accrued to UNITA directly". De Beers now gives a guarantee that none of its diamonds are sourced from conflict zones, and has closed down its African buying offices, but the Mechanism points out that there is "no external validation of the De Beers claim".

--Final Report on the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, Report presented to the Chairman of the UN Security Council Committee concerning the situation in Angola, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, 21 December 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)